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Controversies have existed for some time about 
cybernetics as a subject and difficulties have existed for 
students in obtaining an overview despite the fact that at 
some level several cybernetics concepts can be grasped by 
twelve year olds. An attempt is made to unpack the notion 
of a subject entity and to indicate how far elements in 
cybernetics conform to such a concept within a generally 
acceptable philosophy of science. Ambiguities and 
controversies among key themes of cybernetics are examined 
and resolutions offered. How far the nature of cybernetics 
is likely to create problems of understanding is discussed, 
along with approaches towards the empirical examination of 
how cybernetic ideas are understood. An approach to better 
understanding is formulated and used in an investigation of 
how and how effectively the concept of feedback is grasped 
by various groups. Suggestions are offered from the 
foregoing analysis as to the balance of problems within 




The nature of the problem 
The original orientation of this thesis was purely 
towards how cybernetic concepts could be taught more 
effectively. It soon became apparent however that problems 
necessitated looking at the subject as well as the 
students. The stimuli for this investigation then are 
firstly the signs of dissatisfaction, among cyberneticians 
and their critics, with the success of the cybernetic 
enterprise and secondly the writer's familiarity with the 
facility with which school children can absorb systems and 
cybernetic ideas. [11 This thesis aims to analyse the 
reasons for dissatisfaction and to develop the experiences 
gained from school pupils and investigations with adults to 
suggest appropriate courses of action. 
The following illustrations may help to clarify the 
climate of dissatisfaction alluded to. The writer first 
encountered this mood at the Forward Planning Committee of 
this university in 1972 [21 when the question of the long 
- 
term funding of the Institute of Cybernetics was raised. 
One Head of School opined that cybernetics had failed to 
deliver the fruits promised at its inauguration while 
another asserted that the vast majority of work undertaken 
was being adequately covered in other departments. The 
next evidence of unease was met with among students of the 
Chelsea College cybernetics MSc. course which the writer 
attended in 1974/5 and 1976/7. For both year groups the 
question, "What is cybernetics? " was problematic long 
after the beginning of the course. In subsequent years the 
question was sporadically raised at meetings of the 
Cybernetics Society, one resolution being the concept of, 
"second order cybernetics. " [31 
However cybernetics was attacked as an enterprise 
almost from its birth when Taylor [4] [5] questioned the 
philosophical basis of the "birth certificate of 
cybernetics" by Wiener, Rosenblueth and Bigelow. [61 In 1962 
Pierce [71 was attacking its status. In 1976 Berlinski in, 
"On Systems Analysis, " attacked aspects of the cybernetic 
enterprise. [81 The eighties began with the Norbert Wiener 
essay prize title ofr "Whither Cybernetics, past 
achievements and future prospects"; the "prospects" 
sections of the four winning essays published [91 do not 
read like histories of the last ten years. In 1984 Sowa 
- 
writing "Conceptual Structures: Information processing in 
mind and machine" while acknowledging the common origin of 
A. I. and cybernetics was at pains to distance his 
activities from cybernetics which he implied was a failed 
research program. [101 A critical review by Flood and 
Jackson "Cybernetics and organisation theory" in 1988 cites 
criticisms by various other authors and comes to 
conclusions that are at best guarded and open ended. [111 
When the writer attended the Brunel cybernetics 
MSc. course the degree of anxiety about the nature of the 
subject appeared lower than at Chelsea, -whether due to 
course content, the smaller number of students or other 
factors is uncertain. However uncertainty did exist and 
culminated in one student's questioning the validity of 
cybernetics as a subject entity. [121 The academic 
recognition of a problem may be reflected by the appearance 
of the question "Distinguish between cybernetics and 
systems theory, " on the exam papers of both the Brunel and 
Chelsea MSc. courses during the 1970s. 
Examination of the syllabuses and research 
interests of the six Commonwealth universities or colleges 
listing cybernetics as part of their work shows diversity. 
Some courses seem more similar to courses with "systems" in 
their title, others to those including the label "control, " 
- 
rather than to all of those labelled cybernetics. An 
equivalent diversity appears in mainland Europe. The 
variety of content between introductory cybernetic texts is 
not what would be expected of an established subject. 
Thus we must face the question, is cybernetics some 
kind of a mistake and if so how did it arise? 
However it may be that the dissatisfaction which 
has arisen is due rather/also to our own difficulties in 
handling the ideas which cybernetics attempts to deal 
with. At the individual level it may be that despite their 
ubiquity in the real world, concepts involving dynamism, 
flow and abstract associations are peculiarly difficult for 
our mental machinery. Certainly some cognitive science 
computer models of how memory and understanding work 
propose a relatively reference-book-like, hierarchical 
model of information storage which would pose problems for 
the conceptual modeling of cybernetic concepts. At the 
pedagogic level there is some evidence that existing 
syllabuses, concepts of knowledge and teaching styles are 
inimical to Pupils' and students' understanding of systems 
and cybernetic concepts and that caught early enough they 
may be acquired with considerable aptitude. [131 [141 At the 
higher level of the conventional administration and 
conceptualisation of fields of academic knowledge it is 
- 
worth asking whether there are any particular aspects of 
cybernetics which actively militate against its placement 
alongside existing knowledge divisions. If so what degree 
of importance should be attached to this? Claims for a 
useful abstract overview of any field despite a lesser 
knowledge and experience base are hardly going to be met 
with indifference from experts within that field. 
Lastly to obtain perspective one must consider the 
self questionings of other subjects. Self doubt and 
external criticism are not unique to cybernetics. Social 
scientists are particularly prone to attacks on the 
validity of their subject entities but even such models as 
physics are not immune [151 [161 and areas of uncertainty 
potentially destabilising most previous assumptions have 
been as vigorously debated there as anywhere. 
While there is always a danger that too abstract a 
level of analysis may become a substitute for useful 
activity at more basic levels, the previous considerations 
lead us firstly, in the next two chapters, to some 
examination of the insights that the philosophy of science 
can offer us and how we can recognise a properly formed 
scientific subject. Chapter four examines cybernetics in 
the light of these criteria and after considering how the 
whole hangs together examines potential weaknesses in some 
- 
of the parts. In view of the fact that part of the malaise 
in cybernetics might be due to sheer intellectual 
difficulty a review is conducted of research which might 
enable an examination of that possibility and suggest ways 
in which cybernetic concepts could be grasped more 
effectively. From this analysis the main investigation of 
chapter six chooses the concept of feedback to explore how 
effective individuals' facility with a cybernetic concept 
can be. These results and the previous work provides 
arguments for a particular perspective of cybernetics 
outlined in the last chapter. 
- 
Chapter 2 
What is a Field of Knowledge? 
Before determining what is uniquely cybernetic it 
will help to clarify what are the general characteristics 
of any field of knowledge. Surprisingly very little recent 
philosophical work has been done on this; intriguingly most 
of what has been done has been done by writers with a 
systems orientation. [171 one of the Problems clearly has 
been the proliferation of subject categories during this 
century. Reschler [181 blames the trend in philosophy to 
matters of microscopic detail and the aversion to syntheses 
for the failure of this century's writers to follow the 
attempts of Comte, Mill, Pierce, Hegel or Kant. 
A search among educational theorists likewise 
reveals a failure to attack this question. Conceivably 
this is because curriculum theorists have come to define 
the role of education as serving society or the individual 
rather than conveying an abstract body of knowledge. [19] 
[201 
- 
In this century it is among librarians that the 
most impressive responses to the challenge of deciding what 
is a field of knowledge have been made. Foremost has been 
Ranganathan [211 whose general theory was a response to the 
limitations in the serial nature of the Dewey, Library of 
Congress and early Universal Decimal Classification 
systems. 
However before we consider Ranganathan's response 
it is as well to identify the limitations of an answer to 
be expected from any particular professional viewpoint and 
indeed whether an answer can exist separable from such a 
viewpoint. The obvious constraints of a librarian are that 
his or her system must generally be reducible to a linear 
organisation (until all documents are stored 
electronically) and that once catalogued the information 
must be retrievable in a way which is intuitively 
appropriate to the user. Most particularly the user 
expects when browsing to find related subjects together - 
Ranganathan's APUPA pattern (Alien -Penumbral -Umbral 
-Penumbral -Alien). [221 
It could perhaps be argued that there are no such 
things as fundamental subjects or any intrinsic divisions 
of knowledge. Such a viewpoint might claim that popularly 
accepted categorisations are simply the remnants of 
- 
outmoded academic curricula which for historical reasons 
remain convenient. Put more generally one might propose 
that what we see as separate subjects loosely connected in 
some dimensional space are merely social conveniences 
reflecting the lifestyles arising from our particular 
organisation of work and leisure in the last few 
centuries. An even stronger stance might state that all 
knowledge was inextricably related (or unrelated, the 
conclusions are the same), and that therefore any divisions 
could only be arbitrary and subjective. 
To refute this would involve a kind of multivariate 
analysis for the whole universe of present knowledge; a 
drawing of relationships between nodes to identify the 
prominent clumps. Even ignoring such epistemological 
questions as whether the initial process of crystalisation 
out of the basic "facts" would not predetermine the 
results, it is clear that such a task is untenable; 
librarians have devoted lifetimes to less ambitious 
projects. Thus we must tolerate tenets which arise from 
intuition and are not refuted by analysis or experience. 
Pask's "entailment structures" provide a suggestive 
approach to identifying the cohesion of knowledge 
areas. [23] However they are dependent initially on the 
opinions of a subject expert and an infinite number of 
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entailment structures may be produced for any one topic. 
Until many entailment structures were publicly available 
for at least the conventional range of educational topics 
the project of trying to cluster knowledge by this method 
would be overwhelming if built up from details, and as 
subjective as any other starting at a grosser level of 
analysis. 
While Popper's, "World Three, " concept of objective 
knowledge [241 would provide a "high level" basis to begin 
an enquiry into the coherence of subjects or fields of 
knowledge it is safer to begin by examining the utility of 
such conceptions from the viewpoint of the mind of the 
user. Memory, it has been observed for a long time, works 
to some extent by association. [251 [261 [271 Association 
itself is not a homogenous network but tends to work in a 
series of levels i. e. associations are grouped together 
and so on. Thus "chunking up" to subjects might be 
regarded as the top level of such groupings. These 
considerations do not it should be noted pre-empt 
holographic or other distributive models of memory [281 
[291 although arguably such models or models with a 
distributive component enable a greater variety and 
flexibility of coordinative "superstructures" - which would 
help to explain the existence of controversy in the first 
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place. 
Without a tendency to make associations the brain 
would almost certainly face an insurmountable retrieval 
problem (among others). Hence what appears at first sight 
as a superficial limitation in the librarian's task of 
categorising subjects emerges as at least an identical 
restriction on human beings, if not a fundamental 
determinant. on what basis are such associations made and 
which criteria of similarity can be accepted as legitimate 
for the formation of subject classification? Clearly 
associations based on mnemonics, [301 despite their power, 
would not do. The reason, apart from any aesthetic 
revulsion, would appear to be their inability to tie 
together large bodies of knowledge and their tendency to 
become unique to the individual, which restricts useful 
communication. The Associationists particularised their 
own criteria of association ( eg. contiguity succession 
similarity contrast) [311 which are a slightly condensed 
subset of those formulated by librarians, particularly 
Ranganathan [321 (eg. his PMEST criteria, Personality 
Matter Energy Space Time, or cf. Richardson, [331 Logical 
Geometrical Chronological Genetic Historical Evolutionary 
Dynamic). it does not seem illogical to suggest that 
criteria that have utility for the human mind may be 
- 12 - 
reasonably homologous with objective reality, both because 
of the exigencies of evolutionary development [341 and 
because brain and mind must be a part of that reality. 
Hence the answers of librarians appear to give the best 
available response to the question posed in the title of 
this section. 
Despite its age we must return to the work of 
Ranganathan as the most fundamental exposition of what 
librarians have to tell us on this subject. It is true 
that by 1961 the Universal Decimal Classification had taken 
on Ranganathan's. "colon" feature [351 and since then it 
has utilised and modified other of his principles. [361 
However Ranganathan provides the fullest articulation of 
principles. As a reasonably contemporary confirmation we 
may quote Foskett [37] "In the vast majority of cases they 
(the citation orders found in Ranganathan's Colon 
Classification) are both clear and helpful, and this is the 
only scheme in which we find this situation. " Other 
writers show a growing acceptance of facet analysis 
constructed from Ranganathan's PMEST formula as the best 
basis for an index language. [381 
Ranganathan's basic inspiration was the Meccano set 
[391. In the same way as a variety of different toys could 
be built with a few simple components he sought to "combine 
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bits of ideas in several ways to represent a variety of 
subjects. " Ideas, facts, books and documents were seen as 
having a number of facets, which could in turn be 
categorised under the PMEST isolate divisions outlined 
above. 
These facets were capable of being embodied in the 
document's coding, creating a classificational system which 
was potentially multidimensional. Ranganathan posited 
various canons (such as decreasing concreteness) to 
determine priorities in ordering such facets (and thus make 
reduction to a linear systematisation possible). Post 
facto the formulation of facets and thus necessarily of 
basic subjects could be presented as a purely recursive 
operation. In fact the process was inevitably primed by 
using some traditionally accepted subject categories; its 
validity was supported by the fact that facets built up 
into entities which grouped (by Ranganathan's canons) into 
intuitively acceptable subject categories and permitted the 
development of new ones. (The system is dynamic. ) 
Although his efforts to produce the most helpful 
sequence of facets and isolates led him to postulate an 
"absolute syntax of ideas" [40] the task of articulating it 
was never undertaken --it would require, "cooperative 
research in psychology, statistics, linguistics, 
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anthropology, and reference service. " What is of use to us 
is his criteria of main or basic subjects (for our purposes 
the same thing) which were cumulatively formulated over the 
three main revisions of his colon classification. 
It is simplest to quote the relevant sections from 
Gopinath's summary [411, firstly to classify main 
subjects. 
"l Traditional main subjects - these are main 
subjects that have been traditionally taken for granted as 
the first order divisions of the universe of subjects. 
Mathematics, physics, chemistry, engineering, medicine, 
literature, linguistics, religion, and history are examples 
of traditional main subjects. 
2 Distilled main subjects -a pure discipline is 
evolved out of the experiences in its appearance-in-action 
in diverse compound subjects going with different basic 
subjects. Management science and system analysis are 
examples of this kind. 
3 Fused main subject the trend of 
inter-disciplinary approach among specialists has created a 
number of fused main subjects. Biochemistry, chemical 
engineering, and geopolitics are examples of this kind; 
they stem from the fusion of two or more traditional 
- 15 - 
disciplines. 
4 Other kinds of main subjects - literary warrant 
on a few subjects satisfy certain criteria stipulated for 
deeming a subject as a main subject. .. Journalism, public 
health, applied psychology, industrial economics, and 
social work are examples. " 
Criteria for identifying a new subject include 
[ 42 1: - 
"l A subject which calls for schedules of special 
isolates forming facets of a set of compound subjects going 
with one and the same host subject; 
2A subject which has to be taken as the central 
subject and in which one cannot distinctively recognise 
isolate facets. In other words, a subject which can not be 
expressed as the compound subject; and 
3A subject which has some specialisation. in 
academic circles - such as degree courses, periodicals, 
etc. " 
Thus a subject may be regarded as coalescing (or 
for a non-subject not coalescing) in the multi-dimensional 
space of the facets but by prioritising the facets a linear 
position may also be found. 
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it 1S worth noting that the classification of 
cybernetics in the Colon system has occupied four separate 
positions to date (with similar shifts in the U-D-C-) and 
merited a paper by Gopinath on the issue. [431 It entered as 
related to biology and maths, then became a division of 
maths, followed by the status of a distilled main subject 
dealing with integrated wholes. Its latest classification 
was primarily influenced by an article on cybernetics by 
Caianiello [441 corroborated by Klir and Valach [451 and 
Cybernetic Abstracts and it now resides as a main subject 
with a position between maths and physics. 
We may bear the previous discussion in mind as we 
examine the status of cybernetics, but before we examine 
cybernetics per se we must determine what should be the 
criteria of validity of a subject; phrenology might once 
have attained subject status but its knowledge claims are 
discredited. 
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Chapter 3 
What is Justified Knowledge? 
To continue to secure our grounds and guide future 
analysis we need to decide upon what the status of any 
subject, particularly a science, rests. There is little 
point in trying to assess cybernetics according to criteria 
under which all subjects would fail. on the other hand to 
swallow the case of some of the most radical philosophers 
of science [461 which put all belief systems on a par would 
make this inquiry meaningless or at best restrict it to 
sociology. 
Various necessary or sufficient conditions have 
been proposed as ensuring the validity of a set of 
conjectures: - statements should be; logical [471, empirical 
[481, coherent [49], operationalisable [501,, falsifiable 
[51], or able to create novel predictions [521. 
While all of these are useful tools, we accept the 
analysis of Newton-Smith [531 that there is no known static 
set of objective criteria that will identify justified 
- 18 - 
knowledge; the judgement of the scientist can not be 
excluded. This does not mean however that the whole 
question becomes merely a part of the sociology of 
knowledge; such a programme would invalidate the sociology 
of knowledge itself. Science certainly makes progress in 
the range of phenomena it can accurately predict, and while 
any particular theory outside mathematics will probably be 
invalidated within two hundred years the concept of science 
continually increasing its verisimilitude, its closeness to 
the truth, is plausible enough for us to work with, even 
though Newton-Smith's defence of the concept of 
verisimilitude is not rigorous [541 "The ultimate test (of 
superiority of a scientific theory) in terms of long-range 
predictive success controls the evolution of the other 
factors through a feedback mechanism. "[551 
Thus the various criteria of justified knowledge 
offered by philosophers of science will be treated as 
useful tools in assessing cybernetics but we will not 
reject the possiblity that in some respects its progress 
has been affected by sociological pressures. While noting 
Etemad's conclusion at the end of his cybernetics 
dissertation [561, "There is as yet no consensus on the 
form of a scientific theory, " without recapitulating the 
protagonist's arguments, our judgement is that the most 
- 19 - 
respectable banner to proceed under is that of 
Newton-Smith's, "Temporate Rationalism. " 
- 20 - 
Chapter 4 
The (dis)unity of the field of cybernetics 
Before attempting some kind of cybernetic taxonomy 
it helps to be clear about the nature of the subject one 
aims to taxonomise. A variety of viewpoints are available 
with respect to cybernetics: 
a) cybernetics as a field of basic phenomena to be 
studied; analogous with, say biology or physics, 
b) cybernetics as a toolkit of concepts for 
handling situations or phenomena which may arise 
unpredictably in a variety of areas; analogous with 
mathematics or logic, 
c) cybernetics as a school of philosophy; for 
example the view that sentience is simply the result of a 
concatenation of feedback loops [571 or second order 
cybernetics. 
d) cybernetics as an epistemology i. e. the notion 
that reality is best understood in the analysis of 
- 21 - 
relationships and processes rather than by division into 
absolutes or fundamentals along the lines of Plato[581 or 
1960s particle physicists. 
e) cybernetics as a series of questions, problems, 
a research programme to which we seek, adapt and reject 
provisional answers; thus the question might be, "How is 
purposive behaviour possible? " or "How do the values which 
emerge in 'justified interventions' in sub-systems develop 
from the simple systems out of which they are ultimately 
created? " [591 
f) cybernetics as systems theory with philosophical 
sophistication, 
g) cybernetics as that subset of systems theory 
which excludes non-gubernatorial phenomena, [601 
h) cybernetics as a synonym for systems theory, [611 
i) cybernetics as a set of axioms from which a set 
of deductions about higher level interactive phenomena can 
be derived, [621 
j) cybernetics as a subset of maths dealing with 
abstract systems characteristics. [631 [641 
k) cybernetics as (one of a series of -cf. Goethe 
- 22 - 
[651 [661r Bogdanov's Tektology [671, the later Logical 
Positivists [681, F Capra's manifesto [691) 
socio-historical epiphenomenon arising out of a general 
orientation to interdisciplinary studies. 
1) cybernetics as an abstraction of science, being 
the study and classification of interactions. [701 
Clearly these viewpoints can be subdivided and/or 
recombined. 
4.1 Higher level classification problems 
A review of syllabuses, book sales and research 
publications could only be made to yield a consensus 
viewpoint by simplistic initial assumptions and 
sophisticated statistics. It could then still be argued 
that truth is not a matter of head counting and that a 
general consensus simply reflects general misapprehension. 
Thus our task is either to choose one of the available 
models of cybernetics or to indicate something better. 
The task is one which has been attempted more by 
self avowed systems theorists than cyberneticians, although 
- 23 - 
contents pages of general texts provide some form of 
model. Troncale has produced a relatively simple model of 
eleven focal packets of fifty seven "principle systems 
concepts. "[711 He provides a graphic display using nine of 
his focal packets. (Seven of these are detailed in the 
next section giving some key concepts with applications 
taken from a putative "cognitive map. " The items chosen 
were arrived at independently. ) A possible limitation 
might be the lack of integration of the concept of 
information in the display and the impression that some 
concepts are chosen for mutual support rather than their 
predominance in publications. 
Another systems theorist wrote to all the 
contributors of, "Trends in General Systems Theory" (ed. G 
Klir 1972) asking them who were the major influencers of 
their views on general systems. The writers cited with 
most frequency were; Ashby (17), von Bertalanffy (9), 
Rapoport (7), Wiener (7). Klir (6), Zadeh (5), Boulding 
(4), von Foerster (4). Bateson (3), Shannon (3) and von 
Neumann(3). Another 46 authors were mentioned once. 
Systems theory at least then shows a degree of both 
coherence and diffusion. However simply describing states 
of affairs is not a sufficient scientific activity. One 
looks for some justifiable unifying rationale. Kant put it 
- 24 - 
quite well. " For it will often be f ound , that the originator of a science, and even his latest successors, 
remain attached to an erroneous idea, which they can not render clear to themselves, and thus they fail in 
determining the true content, the articulation or 
systematic unity, and the limits of their science. 
"It is unfortunate that, only after having occupied 
ourselves for a long time in the collection of materials, 
under the guidance of an idea which lied underdeveloped in 
the mind, but not according to any definite plan of 
arrangement - nay, only after we have spent much time and labour in the technical disposition of our materials does it become possible to view the idea of a science in a clear 
light, and to project, according to architectonical 
principles, a plan of the whole, in accordance with the 
aims of reason. Systems seem, like certain worms, to be 
formed by a kind of generatio aequivoca - by a mere 
confluence of conceptions, and to gain completeness only 
with the progress of time. But the schema or germ of all 
lies in reason; and thus is not only every system organised 
according to its own idea, but all are united in one grand 
system of human knowledge, of which they form members. "[721 
While rejecting a pure coherence theory of truth, operating 
broadly on a correspondence model, coherence may be 
regarded as the essential criterion for the denomination of 
a subject entity, as also emerged from Ranganathan. 
Coherence is also a useful tool in truth testing, being 
necessary but not sufficient. 
an old fashioned ring in 
For some the notion may have 
view of the notions of 
complementarity and scientific pluralism [731 [741 , but 
its driving force in the development of science remains 
undeniable. For clarity of exposition a possible coherence 
model of cybernetics is introduced first and justifications 
and objections considered later as they emerge in its 
development. 
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Let us assert that those aspects of the world with 
which science is at present having most difficulty lie in 
the understanding of large complex systems, such as 
ecosystems, economies, societies, brains, I brain-like' 
artifacts (computers or intelligent programs) and the 
expression of animal development through DNAS. Prima facie 
evidence for this lies in the failures of human society in 
predicting the behaviour of such naturally occuring 
systems, and the volume of research effort invested in 
developing artificial systems with similar potential. A 
part of this difficulty lies in the impossibility of 
applying the traditional scientific principle of "ceteris 
paribus" in such situations; thus comes the demand for new 
tools of analysis. 
If we accept such notions we may assert that 
cybernetics is unified by the search for and application of 
common explanatory concepts for the common phenomena unique 
to large complex systems. Life becomes more contentious 
when we try to assert what such common concepts are or 
place them in a hierarchy. obviously the set is open, some 
concepts may be yet to be arrived at, others may prove to 
be misconceived. The justification for cybernetics would 
only collapse if it were proven that there were no common 
unique properties to such systems, although it would retain 
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a place in the history of thought along with say animism to 
explain why such properties were imagined to exist in the 
first place. Given common phenomena the set of 
explanations would be corrigible and capable of 
refinement. However if the set were limited and easily 
articulated the research impetus could soon decline. 
Trivially almost anything may be viewed as a 
system. If the quark and its friends prove to be products 
of mutual interaction and reflection [75] then at a certain 
level most forms of matter may be regarded as systems or 
agglomerations of such. Hence there is a danger of trying 
to include an unwieldy number of properties as system 
properties. We may prune this set by refusing to regard as 
cybernetic anything that can be explained by static 
analysis, without a time arrow, and continue to refine it 
by excluding say dynamic systems which can be characterised 
by single value functions and so on up to a prescribed 
level of mathematical complexity; or we may define the 
adjectives 'large complex' recursively and characterise 
them as pertaining to those systems whose properties 
interest us as being common to the highest level systems 
and inexplicable by particulate analysis (i. e. analysis of 
their most atomistic units). That the latter definition is 
recursive may be deemed unsatisfactory but recursive 
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definitions are ubiquitous in science and may be tolerated 
pending a fuller understanding of the field being 
investigated. Moreover the two pruning systems may be 
regarded as mutually supporting in so far as they prove 
coterminous. 
Before venturing to propose common unique 
properties of large complex systems it is helpful to note 
the development of key concepts in other areas. It is part 
of the success of science that its concepts are corrigible 
and not static. Thus Dalton's concept of the atom is so 
different from say Pauli's as to hardly merit the same 
name, likewise the Newtonian and string theory views of 
space. [76] Nevertheless earlier concepts may retain their 
usefulness for pedogogical reasons or within a limited 
universe of discourse. For example electrical (as opposed 
to electronic) theory does not require anything more 
sophisticated than the Rutherford model of the atom and it 
is hard to see how anyone could understand De Broglie's 
model without first grasping Bohr's. Paul Lorenzen's 
comments about physics, though possibly reflecting 
frustration more than belief, warn us that we should not 
expect our task to be easy. "When we simply speak about 
physics we use it only as a collective noun for a multitude 
of past and present scientific activities. The word 
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I physics' describes one aspect of human activity which for 
the moment at least, is given only in historic terms. "[77] 
To focus first on Wiener's earliest notions; "The 
group of scientists about Dr. Rosenblueth and myself had 
already become aware of the essential unity of the set of 
problems centering about communication, control, and 
statistical mechanics, whether in the machine or living 
tissue. "[781. Since the concept of control can largely 
subsume the notions of communication and statistical 
mechanics and because of its link to the etymology of the 
word cybernetics we shall begin by examining the role of 
the notion of control as a unifying characteristic among 
the properties of large complex systems. Such systems we 
may propose either control some aspect of their own 
behaviour or part of some process which may be viewed with 
the control system as part of a larger system. 
Less interesting is open-loop control, with a 
linear chain of causation in which there is no way of 
adjusting according to the effectiveness of the control 
process; as for example when the depression of a key leads 
to a symbol appearing on the screen of a word processor. 
More interesting is closed loop control with a circular 
chain of causation where there is automatic adjustment 
according to the effectiveness of the basic control 
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process; frequently circular causal processes are labelled 
"feedback". 
While the notion of control is ubiqitous, problems 
have emerged. From a conventional scientific viewpoint it 
highlights the problem of dualism. There is the controller 
and that which is controlled; from the former emerges the 
notion of purpose-like behaviour which so intrigued the 
early cyberneticians [791. Clearly at some level some 
behaviours of both animals and automatic control machines 
bear formal similarities [801 and both embody feedback 
mechanisms but the attempt to attribute the property of 
purposiveness to all systems with feedback mechanisms [811 
has been discredited by Taylor and Searle. [821 [831 [841 
Pursuing the spectre of dualism in cybernetics 
(which cyberneticians usually claim to transcend), as the 
notion of control implies control for a purpose, so purpose 
leads to the notion of reasons or rationale for that 
purpose; in other words, ultimately, values. (The choice 
of "ethics" as part of the theme for the 1990 annual 
conference of the Cybernetics Society possibly reflects 
awareness of this problem. ) Such an emergence may be seen 
as inevitable once cyberneticians had formulated the notion 
of automatic, closed loop control: with the simple 
thermostat there is an outsider to select the setting of 
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the thermostat, with more sophisticated machines which can 
function according to various criteria the choice is 
internalised into a higher level loop, hence the 
inevitability of a top level values loop (so far only in 
human "systems") , and the tension in the program to derive 
common phenomena from the properties of animate and 
inanimate large complex systems. 
Obviously the introduction of the notion of values 
into science may be seen as a challenge to its traditional 
purview. 
Many cyberneticians and systems analysts clearly 
believed that from the notion of control and thereby 
information they could elicit a rational, optimal analysis 
of a system or situation which obviated the explicit need 
for the importation of (presumably subjective) values [851. 
As Sharp's article in "Computing" showed this belief was 
also discredited. 
The tendency of cybernetics to divide the world 
into two universes of discourse; the physical and the 
informational (at which level resided control) also had 
challenges from within, 
"Norbert Wienerr ... is partly responsible for that 
secret mongering in connection with the concept of 
information and the theories about it. The haze with which 
Wiener surrounded this concept in order to place it 
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alongside, as equally important and equally fundamental as the concept s of mass and energy can probably be traced back 
to a mix up of statistical, communication theoretical 
information with semantic information. This was recognised if somewhat late, but a confus ion did result and even 
nowadays, twenty years later, people still fall for 
it. "[861 
Waddington more reservedly commented that, "Wiener 
shouted 'Eureka' at least as loud as the traffic could 
take. "[871 The notion that physical information measures 
provided the entree to cracking the problems of mind found 
first widespread enthusiasm and then widespread 
disillusionment. Science had previously accepted such 
uncomfortable notions as action at a distance and 
probability but as possible implications of reifying the 
matter and energy vs. information distinction dawned, and 
progress appeared to falter, credibility was strained. one 
strategy has been to delimit the notion of information and 
find an available conceptual field for the remaining areas 
of difficulty. This leads us to Stewart's "Ternary" theory 
which gives concepts a position in a physical domain, an 
informational domain and/or an evaluative domain. [881 [891 
1901 1911 
The danger of the waters into which cybernetics was 
getting with either the denial of or the emergence of value 
(and other higher level concepts eg. consciousness [921) 
might have been anticipated from the strictures of Hume (as 
Stewart pointed out). [931 "Hume's Law" which is popularly 
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rendered as, "you can't get is from 'ought', " is 
unarguable, but the reverse proposition which he argued 
for, that values or moral distinctions can not be derived 
from the facts [94] i. e. information, creates problems for 
cybernetics. 
Just as Bar-Hillel's comments indicate unease about 
the distinction between the physical and the informational 
level of description it appears that the informational 
domain itself may be insufficient to handle the notion of 
control, at least at all conceivable levels; [951 if so 
cybernetics would need to be divided into three parts and 
we would face the issue of whether the information/'values' 
split was any more intellectually satisfactory than that of 
the physical/informational split. If we examine Hume's 
reasons for his shibboleth, "Moral distinctions not deriv'd 
from reason, " we find that however impressive his 
conclusion his justifications are less so. 
Hume distinguishes between the "actions and 
affections" and "reason" which he identifies with the 
process of deriving conclusions from facts. He then 
proceeds, "Since morals,. therefore have an influence on the 
actions and affections, it follows that they cannot be 
deriv'd from reason. " [961 i. e. 
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is not = 
r affects p therefore 
q not affect r 
which is simply a non sequitur, both because p not 
being q does not exclude any relationship of influence 
between them (eg. I am not my father but he may influence 
me) and because any such influence is still irrelevant to 
the possibility of q affecting r. 
His failure to divorce data from values is 
illustrated in the next paragraph. "As long as it is 
allow'd, that reason has no influence on our passions and 
actions, tis in vain to pretend, that morality is 
discovered only by a deduction of reason. " The first 
premise is surely false; eg. reports of the prospects of 
acquiring HIV virus have reduced the level of similarly 
transmitted diseases: the inclusion of the word "only" in 
Hume's conclusion is an admission of possibility which 
severely damages his case. 
The diversity of Hume s arguments, which are mainly 
presented in the first twenty pages of Book III of "A 
Treatise.. " suggest the inadequacy of any one of them. His 
solution of deriving values from a sense of values, "Moral 
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distinctions derived from a 
unsatisfactorily tautological. 
moral sense, " [971 is 
However as Hume continues he appears to end up at 
the opposite position to which he began; the impressions by 
which we determine moral good or its contrary are simply 
particular pleasures or pains. [98] The link with 
Utilitarianism has been made explicitly by Mary Warnock 
[99] and was acknowledged by Bentham himself. 
At a practical level Kohlberg's work on moral 
development explicitly attempts to show the 
inappropriateness of the "Naturalistic Fallacy" (you can't 
get "ought" from "is") by demonstrating a series of stages 
which individuals (may) go through in arriving at a their 
own moral values and which stand up in cross cultural 
comparison. [1001 
The upshot for our purposes is that a provisional 
distinction between values and information may be 
legitimate in cybernetics but we can not assume that this 
divorce is permanent; the effort to link the two might 
ultimately produce useful insights. The practise of 
accepting a principle eg. action at a distance, which can 
not be fully justified has been fruitful 
in other areas and 
may serve where we can not yet explain 
in cybernetics. 
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The discussion of a "tertiary domain" in 
cybernetics [1011 is necessary because it might be here 
that some ultimate "higher level" unifying factors could be 
assumed to inhere. But it is worth noting Mill's caveatr 
[1021 (echoing Kant) "The truths which are ultimately 
accepted as the first principles of a science, are really 
the last results of metaphysical analysis, practised on the 
elementary notions with which the science is conversant. " 
The problem of the tension elicited in the previous 
paragraphs is underlined by Mill's potentially 
contradictory statement,, "Questions of ultimate ends are 
not amenable to direct proof. " [1031. Could a tertiary 
domain in cybernetics have a single unifying theme? For 
example must it consist of a collection of unrelated value 
dimensions or could such elements be subordinated to a 
hierarchy under a system such as some form of 
utilitarianism? With respect to this question respectable 
philosophers differ. [1041 
However values are not the only possible contenders 
for a domain of cybernetics transcending information. 
Traditional Darwinism would offer us the simple notion of 
survival as the justification for higher level information 
control loops. More modern notions of co-evolution [1051 
offer emergent phenomena within which a justification space 
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for other cybernetic manifestations might be located. 
Another claim to transcend notions of information comes 
from Maturana [1061 with the notion of autopoesis in which 
the organism is seen as creating its own meanings (values? ) 
which can not be meaningfully interpreted within any 
overarching system. The formal similarity to Husserl's 
idea of a 'ding an sich' which held together phenomenology 
and out of which emerged existentialism is obvious. It is 
probably not co-incidence that Prigogine's concern with 
self-transcendent systems leads him and Stengers to a 
concern with "becoming" reminiscent of the earlier school 
of philosophy. [107] However it might be argued that none of 
these alternatives are essentially more than the selection 
of a single value coherence notion from what is essentially 
a plurality. it may be noted that unless values are 
somehow linked to "what is" - Stewart's primary and 
secondary domains, the task of demonstrating the unity of 
cybernetics can never be completed. Having established 
that an examination of the notion of control can be used to 
demonstrate the feasibility of Stewart's tripartite 
division of cybernetics (or at least the examination of 
systems), despite some difficulties, we can continue to 
examine the connotations of the central idea of control. 
While being a useful every-day concept the notion 
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of "control" incorporates some assumptions which we may be 
less happy about when examined close up. Firstly the 
notion is not wholy objective. It contains the subjective 
imputation beyond what can be observed that X only did Y 
because of Z. As such it carries all the philosophical 
objections that Hume raised to the notion of cause and 
effect and more. Secondly the notion is ambiguous because 
it is not necessarily clear whether a goal is implied in 
Z's control of X and any status attributed to such a goal 
can easily be either tautological or yet more subjective. 
Another ambiguity in the word "control" is that it is 
unclear on the degree of determinacy between X and Y as a 
result of Z. 
There is a pool of analogous words, each with their 
strengths and weaknesses, which might offer themselves as 
alternative core concepts in cybernetics; influence, 
communication, interaction, autonomy, dynamic pattern, 
cause; each carrying a greater or lesser weight of 
attribution by the observer. However even when we attempt 
to use the notion which most drastically aims to purge the 
presuppositions of the observer i. e. to simply describe 
pattern [1081 the patterns we are able to see will be a 
function of our previous suppositions embodied in our 
theories and the "wiring" of our nervous system [1091. 
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Neuro-holography theorists would attribute such perceptual 
rigidity to the "grain" of the filter. [1101 
Hence if it is a requirement of a science that it 
does not incorporate presuppositions the validity of which 
can not be demonstrated then apparently cybernetics can not 
be a science, at least with its present "core" notions. An 
obvious rejoinder to this is that under such stringent 
requirements no subject can be regarded as scientific as 
yet. Nevertheless it may be conceded that in observing 
systems cybernetics appears to have to attribute more a 
priori to focus in on its interests than does, say physics 
or anatomy (although there may be a cultural influence in 
the confidence with which we regard phenomena as directly 
observable). [1111 various moves have been made to deal 
with this difficulty and to objectify notions that easily 
become subjective, for example von Bertalanffy's concept of 
"equifinality" [1121 or Sommerhof's "directive correlation" 
[1131. Beer [1141 appears to endorse Maturana and Varela's 
attempt to cope with the spectre of subjectivity which 
involves the denial of the notions of even communication or 
information so far as the living organism is concerned. 
They appear to allow that an organism controls its own 
organisation but elsewhere the concept of control is 
proscribed. For them organisms create their own reality 
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independent of anything "out there" and to attribute 
virtually anything other to the organism than a homeostatic 
maintainance of its own internal relations is a kind of 
self-indulgent subjectivism on the part of the observer. 
Why their own position is not therefore equally so is not 
readily apparent. Certainly it could be accused of merely 
being an elegant tautology. Provisionly we might simply 
concede that large complex systems show "control-like" 
phenomena and examine what notions of interaction are 
useful in explaining them. 
This brings us back to generally familiar 
cybernetic notions which could be characterised as 
belonging to the secondary (and usually also the primary) 
domain. 
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4.2 Elements of a Cybernetics Syllabus 
It might be assumed that in order to fulfil the aim 
of this section to indicate the unity of cybernetics, and 
to show the area that this thesis generally refers to, it 
was necessary to produce a detailed interrelated taxonomy 
of cybernetic ideas. Although even then it would be 
necessary to show that the taxonomy produced was either not 
significantly different from all the rest or that it 
embodied superior organising features of coherence and 
correspondence. 
Fortunately in order to demonstrate unity a 
detailed delineation is not necessary; we only have to show 
a reasonable degree of cohesion. Further, it is not 
necessary to claim priority for the cohesion model 
produced. To some extent the model below pre-empts certain 
alternative viewpoints. But it is necessary to offer some 
reasonably articulated structure at this stage in order to 
create a position from which to consider alternatives. 
However alternative models in the same area generally would 
reinforce the basic claim of unity rather than compete with 
it. Certainly if all "cybernetic" concepts could be 
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non-repetetively parcelled out to separate fields where 
they stuck together with other ideas more strongly than in 
cybernetics there would be no point in demonstrating 
cybernetic unity. However to demonstrate this would be a 
considerable task, its very size tending to weaken the 
"anti-cybernetic" claim. Moreover apart from the basic, 
"knowledge cohesion" demonstration later sections will 
reinforce the cohesion-of-cybernetics claim with cognitive 
efficiency arguments. 
While not producing a comprehensive taxonomy the 
principles by which one would be developed are still of 
interest to us in showing cohesion. one approach would be 
to look for guidance to systems and cybernetic notions of 
growth and development. one could seek an elementary 
notion to begin with - hopefully from a more "basic" field 
and aim to show that its elaboration incorporated more 
cybernetic notions, and thence by following an expanding 
vortex demonstrate the "re-emergence" of cybernetic notions 
in more complex areas, from more primitive concepts. We 
might also anticipate that some higher level concepts or 
systems would attain a greater significance and ubiquity 
than the lower level systems phenomena on which their 
emergence originally depended. 
Hence a possible schema or "cognitive map" is 
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presented below. Starting from the centralf elementary and 
abstract notion of "interaction" it spirals round to 
interactive notions of increasing complexity. As far as 
possible in two dimensions related notions are placed 
closer together. Clearly since the brain can make 
connections in many more dimensional characteristics than 
can clearly be represented on paper, positions will become 
more arguable further from the "central core". This is 
reinforced by the fact that complexity frequently provides 
more facets from which linkages can be made. Thirdly 
complexity is frequently associated with specificity; thus 
items at the outer layers will tend increasingly to be 
attributed to the domain of other subjects. 
The notion of "interaction" is chosen as at once 
more general and more elementary than anything else 
available. It does not for example carry the "one-way" 
connotations that traditionally restrict the concept of 
"control. " To the extent that there emerge from conceptions 
of increasing complexity of interaction phenomena to which 
control-like or teleonomic features may be attributed we 
may educe a further level of coherence of traditional 
cybernetic concerns. 
The arrangement below is not as "hard wired" as a 
Buzan "mind map" [1151, in that there are no specific 
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branching pathways between one concept and the next; the 
provisional cognitive map is more a network than a 
taxonomic tree. To achieve a more elegant dimensional 
schemata would put cybernetics in a suspiciously isolated 
class. An examination of A-level syllabuses [1161 for 
example suggests that the best any subject does is take a 
handful of broad categories and sub-divide each into a list 
of items. 
Apart from criteria of coherence and correspondence 
to some "reality" a conceptual subject schema may also be 
evaluated as an effective memory device (as indicated) and 
ultimately for its utility in indicating possible research 
directions both by identifying gaps and by drawing 
attention to overlaps and correlations which may be worth 
elaborating. It is worth remembering that the usefulness 
of a classification scheme lies in the relationships which 
it omits as well as includes (part of the function of 
boundaries and modularity). Finally of course it is a 
fundamental of librarianship that subjects grow and require 
reclassification; thus the ultimate purpose of any 
conceptual scheme is as a provocation to 
reconceptualisation. 
Thus follows an indication of what a two 
dimensional arrangement of relationships, generated on the 
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principles described above, can look like. 
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While the foregoing scheme presents an arrangement of 
abstractions their usefulness depends on the extent to 
which they can be applied to and recognised in a variety of 
concrete situations. It will be a central contention of 
this thesis that while the human difficulty of moving from 
the concrete to the abstract is widely accepted the 
weakness in moving from the abstract to recognising or 
creating new applications in the concrete is vastly 
underrated. Cyberneticians' failure to articulate such 
connections and the wider human difficulty in doing so is, 
it is suggested, a significant factor in the limited impact 
of cybernetic ideas. 
The importance of such apparently mundane activity 
is suggested in the history of biology. Darwin's 
contribution to evolutionary theory was not it may be 
argued in its formulation, which had been proposed before, 
likewise the driving principle of natural selection 
although more significant was developed under the influence 
of Malthus's Principle of Population; however Darwin's 
crucial contribution was in marshalling a plethora of 
supporting detail for over twenty years. 
Thus to give some indications of the richness of 
the field of cybernetic notions we need to begin to itemise 
their occurence. Thus key concepts are taken from the 
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schema above and some applications listed. That some 
applications could be placed under more than one conceptual 
heading might either be evidence of muddle or of the unity 
of this set of ideas. 
EQUILIBRIUM 
balance, principle of moments, pulley system at 
rest, membrane diffusion, laws of diffusion, Le Chatelier's 
principle, gas laws, 2nd law of thermodynamics, Newton's 
third law, balance of forces- physical political, electron 
energy states, sea levels on rotating planet, fluid levels, 
floating in liquid or gas, cloud levels, balloon, body 
pressure/air pressure, maths = sentences, structure of 
solids liquids gases, engineering structures, any lawful 
process from some viewpoint, (In any enduringly 
identifiable entity some component may be identified as in 
equilibrium; something is conserved. It is worth being 
clear about what aspects of the system are or are not in 
equilibrium, what is being focused upon. ) double entry 
book-keeping, long term balance of payments, eventual 
supply and demand, laws of market under perfect 
competition, most traditional economic models, tight rope 
walker, gyroscope, long term partnership, parts of games 
theory, minimax solutions, tit for tat, Nash equilibrium, 
tension on recording tape, muscle tensions round joints, 
depolarisation neurological firing, static dynamic unstable 
metastable neutral equilibria, stability, rule following, 
free fall, basins, chreods, epigenetic landscapes, 
stability through negative feedback, homeostasis, 
ultrastability, closed systems, possible view of some long 
term input output relationships. 
NONEQUILIBRIUM 
prigogine's dissipative systems, negative entropy, 
evolution of chemical complexity, ditto micro and macro 
material complexity, open systems, many positive feedbacks, 
growth economies, ecological spirals. 
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BOUNDARIEVINTERFACE 
skin, guts,, (cell) membrane, sense organs ' effectors, keyboard musical computer, screen, surface's 
atmosphere biosphere, bubble, national borders, hedgerows, 
enclosure, insulators, buffers, proscriptions eg. for 
programming style, social norms restricting forms of interaction, pencil paper, satelite dish, microphone, loudspeaker, telephone, leads carrying signals, channels, 
partitioning, brain/mind, science/society, technology, 
negotiating table, missionary sales advertising activity. 
INTERVENTION 
free fall, slippery slopes, uphill tasks,, 
sinecures, physical informational justificatory, [1171 
barriers, wells, basins, search strategies, O. R. and 
decision theory strategies, relaxation & temperature in PDP 
systems, brief therapy [1181, minimalism,, feedback. 
MODULARITY 
car parts, computer components, stereo system, most 
electro- mechanical consumer durables, body organs, cells 
and cell sub- structures, flower parts, brain areas? 
construction kits, systems building, some college courses, 
subject divisions, universe of galaxies stars and atoms, 
conglomerate structure, some production systems, oil 
refinery, brewery, some retail structures, containerisation 
storage systems, bee hive, box & line diagrams, structured 
programs, Modula II, object oriented processing, Smalltalk, 
frame, chapters, paragraphs, any component of an iterated 
system. 
HIERARCHY 
some religious organisations, most armies, civil 
service, larger commercial organisations, large service 
organisations -N. H. S., pecking orders, computer languages, 
decision trees, some program structures, telephone 
connections, groupings of knowledge, taxonomies, material 
organisation sub-atomic to galaxies. 
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HETERARCHY 
British or U. S. constitution, Winston's block 
worlds and some other A. I. programs, Minsky's brain models, 
brain per se, guerrilia army, SAS unit, some child 
leadership patterns, some working parties & project teams, 
interdisciplinery research teams, some sports teams, small 
co-operatives, possible view of some just-in-time 
manufacturing systems, possible grid network for 
water/electricity supply. 
INPUT/OUTPUT 
data processing eg. keyboard printer, much 
communication theory, production process -raw material 
product, stimulus response, reflex arc, conditioned reflex, 
"black box" testing, exploration of some novel objects, 
empirical science, food waste, mathematical function (or 
set of), educational system, imports exports, balance 
sheet, question answer, coin in the slot machine, orders 
action, "suck it and see". elaboration of cause & effect, a 
view of most flows of material energy information. 
OSCILLATION 
shuttle, tides, many flip flops or bistables, radio 
wave generator, Schmidt oscillator, metronome, pendulum, 
windscreen wipers, rocking horse or chair, see-saw, sine 
wave, simple harmonic motion, piston, candle on pin burning 
at both ends, bell, compression rarefaction resonance 
reverberation, brain waves, undamped negative feedback with 
external stability, coupled positive feedback systems, 
commuting, animal migration, heart beat, breathing, 
contractions, worn computer fan, oestrogen progesterone, 
manic depression, quartz crystal, pulsar, Piaget's 
assimilation & accommodation, hard/soft persuasion 
techniques, some institutional innovations eg. 
centralisation decentralisation rule enforcement, some 
classroom noise levels, some fashions, wake sleep, day 
night, periodicity. 
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CYCLES 
water cycle, nitrogen cycle, Gaia, citric acid 
cycle for oxidation energy rich molecules (Krebs cycle), 
cAMP & slime mould aggregation, metamorphosis life cycles 
eg. liver fluke, protein RNA production, enzymatic behaviour, catalysis, autocatalysis, RNA phage (virus) infection of bacteria, viral mutation cycles co-ordinated 
with hosts' lifespan, Eigen's hypercycles (cycles of 
cycles) for (particularily) pre cellular evolution, 
epigenetic & epigenealogical development, dissipative self 
organisation eg, Belousov-Zhabotinsky reaction, 
Bethe-Weizacker cycle for the transformation of hydrogen to 
helium in stars, service sector of modern economy eg. 
tourism and roads, academic growth publications activity, 
[119] electrical circuit, blood circulation, hot water 
heating system, convection, sun spots, ice ages, Nemesis 
star (periodic world catastophe theory), electric motor, 
internal combustion enginer musical box, food chains, 
biomass cycle, seasonal cycles, menstrual cycle, the Circle 
line journey, the golden triangle trade, economic cycles, 
many board games, neon & traffic light sequences, Hebbian 
reverberating neural circuits, ascending reticular 
activating system, maintainance operations, Halprin's RSVP 
cycle for creative action, the research process, "windows 
of order" within chaos functions, program loops, strange 
attractors, feedback. 
FEEDBACK 
Maxwell's governor, homeostasis oxygen carbon 
dioxide salt sugar, animal's balance, automatic tuning, 
back propagation in PDP systems, iterated prisoner's 
dilemma, elections, TOTEs. many "chaos" equations, some of 
the cycles above, c. 300 examples from subjects in Chapter 
6 section 4. 
SELF ORGANISING SYSTEMS and AUTOPOESIS 
Prigogine's dissipative systems cited above, DNA 
accuracy self checking, genes, living biological systems, 
marriage, family, clan, breeding group, countries, 
religions, corporate structuresf social (class) structures, 
some cognitive growth, educational process, scientific 
endeavour, growth of knowledge, mythopoesis. 
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EVOLUTION & ITS ANALOGUES 
life forms, domestic products, music, ideas, 
science, art? game of life, Eigen's evolution games, 
economic growth corporate variety complexity and 
efficiency, immune system operation, Edelman's selectionist 
neural systems, variety generation & selection for eg. 
design, co-evolution. 
POSSIBLE REQUISITE VARIETY STRATEGIES 
traffic lights' more potential states than 
available car behaviours, users' reduction of language's 
potential variety? teacher controling class by increasing 
own knowledge/range of behaviour, increasing detail of 
legislation & emphasis on self regulation, growth of 
computer records, emergence of norms constraining behaviour 
with stable personalities, Sadam Hussein's 8 bunkers, 
genetic random mutation in evolution, immune system 
strategies, species & product diversification, some code 
breaking key word discovery and solution finding 
strategies, writing long theses, routinisation. 
LOGICAL AUTOMATA 
finite state machine, Moore machine, Turing 
machine, game of life simulated evolution [1201, hodge 
podge machine [121], neural nets,, perceptrons, PDP 
systems. 
MULTI TRACK ORGANISATION 
efficient housework & cookery, large scale 
production processes, critical path analysis, PERT, 
parallel processing (brain & hard/soft wear), household 
wiring, multiplexing, aircraft ground movements, overall 
physiological functioning. 
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4.3 Remarks on the development of cvbernetics 
The map above contains some elements that have not featured 
prominently in the cybernetic literature but which on the 
schema above are a logical development of it, specifically 
the concepts of chaos theory and non equilibrium and far 
from equilibrium situations. Their root influences are 
very much in the area which originally excited Wiener and 
his co-workers. Thus chaos is concerned with iterated 
cycles of development in which the outcome determines the 
next development as occurs with positive feedback 
mechanisms. (This relationship is discussed further in the 
examination of feedback in the next section. ) It is 
noteworthy that Wiener warned against the use of existing 
mathematical models in the social sciences and was 
sceptical about the development of cybernetics there after 
contemplating Mandelbrot's graphs of movements in the 
commodity markets where he showed that the market's 
contemplation of its own irregularites created something 
more complex than could be handled by differential 
equations; in essence a fractal. [122] Statistical mechanics 
is one way of handling an infinite number of elementsf 
chaos concepts are another. 
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Likewise Prigogine's concern with the developments 
in negative entropy situations within the flux of entropy 
[1231 [124] are essentially the implementations of 
schrodinger's theory about life [1251 which as the prime 
example of an open system is a basic of cybernetics. 
However the working through of the details which Prigogine 
undertook has produced a richness of understanding and 
support which has been more impressive than simply 
reiterating the original broad concept. 
Prigogine's concerns also link with the increasing 
awareness in biology that the notion of control transcends 
itself and moves towards co-evolution. Jantsch in 
criticising Ashby's claim that the notion of requisite 
variety models the interaction between species and niche 
quotes CU von Weizacker's arguments that in life the issue 
is not control but dynamic connectedness, "Total adaptation 
and total non-adaptation are both lethal. In ecology, a 
niche fits the species sufficiently without defining it; 
the species, in turn, fits the niche sufficiently, without 
defining it. What else is fitting, but not defining each 
other, than an emancipated relation. " [1261 
if these developments had arisen from a self 
declared cybernetic or general systems school these fields 
might now be recognised as adequately fruitful. However 
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the historical fact remains that they emerged from 
engagement in detailed empirical work, (with chaos) in a 
variety of areas. The commonalities only gradually became 
apparent and then permitted the application of the same 
approach to some new areas. 
A success of sorts is seen in the re-emergence of 
connectionism. When in 1983 Sowa (cited in Chapter 1) 
sought to distance his approach from the "bottom up" nets 
of the cyberneticians he expressed the widespread feeling 
that Minsky and Papert had demonstrated insuperable 
limitations in the connectionist approach. [1271 In fact 
as Rumelhart and McClelland's two volumes in 1986 showed 
[1281 they only demonstrated the limitations of a 
particular type of model and the contents of such journals 
as "Cognition" show a recent outburst of connectionism. 
Whether their success will cause them to be regarded as a 
separate subject, no longer a part of cybernetics, remains 
to be seen. 
The discussion above points to the probability that 
the status of cybernetics will partly depend on what it can 
continue to offer other subjects i. e. active research 
schools rather than past achievements. 
The map above includes many areas which would be 
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regarded by systems theorists as at least shared territory 
and it is therefore necessary to address the major 
criticism of systems theory. While both fields have claims 
to universality systems theorists seem to attach themselves 
more exclusively to fields where humans enter the system, 
frequently ignoring Wiener's warnings about the use of 
linear mathematics in such areas. This combined with the 
use of inappropriately generalised and simplistic models 
has been the main charge of Berlinsky and McLean. [1291 
[1301 To the extent that cybernetics incorporates systems 
theory it must be tarred with the same brush. The message 
must be to avoid inappropriate mathematics but where there 
is an appropriate mathematics to further understanding of 
the situation to understand and use it properly. (cf. 
Power's comments about some cybernetician's grasp of 
control theory in the next section, under "Feedback". ) 
Elsewhere it may be worth aspiring to Galbraith's dictum, 
"There are few if any useful ideas that can not be 
expressed in clear English. obscurity rarely if ever 
denotes complexity of subject matter; it never denotes 
superior scholarship. It usually signifies either 
inability to write clear English or - more commonly - 
muddled or incomplete thought. "[131] 
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4.4 Controversies in various programmes of cybernetics 
Having examined difficulties in the cohesion of a 
set of cybernetic concepts it is next necessary to examine 
specific elements to see how well they stand up to detailed 
examination, in our objective of identifying why the area 
appears beset with difficulties. 
As has been suggested various proponents of 
particular aspects or interpretations of cybernetics have 
attracted criticism for their advocacy. This section 
considers positions in cybernetics which have been viewed 
with unease and possibly detracted from the objective 
consideration of other cybernetic notions. 
4.4.1 The machine model of human beings 
Understanding humans in terms of the behaviour, or 
potential behaviour, of machines and producing machines 
with human abilities has been seen by critics and 
expositors alike as a central theme of cybernetics. 
Negative responses to this have been that such a programme 
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is dehumanising and/or nonsensical. 
To the dehumanising claim one might respond that 
the same anxieties raised by the theories of Galileo or 
Darwin did not make their theories untrue. Secondly to 
move to the induction that formal or fundamental 
similarities between people and machines legitimates 
treating people like simple machines is not logical. If 
fundamental similarites were found between what was 
regarded as a machine and a human being this would equally 
raise the issue of whether the "machine" should be treated 
with more consideration. 
To critics of the sense in trying to understand 
humans in terms of actual or potential machines the 
argument depends on the depth of the homomorphism. To 
attempt to build better robots in terms of neuronal or 
parallel distributed processing models based on brain 
"guesstimates" seems to be eminently achievable. [1321 [1331 
However attributing consciousness or sensation to 
fundamentally machine like processes [1341 [1351 [1361is to 
enter highly controversial philosophical territory. [1371 
Cyberneticians who continue to push the argument will face 
the odium of many philosophers unless machines are produced 
which demonstrate the range of characteristics by which 
individuals attribute consciousness and sensation to one 
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another. 
However an attempt to produce machines which 
simulate some of the characteristics of consciousness may 
be justified by its by-products (eg. expert systems). 
Secondiy the continued failure of such a program would 
itself be a useful piece of scientific and philosophical 
evidence. Pragmatically the machine metaphor or fact opens 
up lines of research into areas of human function which 
would once have been regarded as intractable and it has not 
legitimised any tendency for humans to treat other humans 
as inert tools. if debate were conducted at the level of 
inferred consequences of the machine model it is probable 
that protagonists would agree about what would be 
undesirable actions and what desirable but deny that the 
undesirable could be infered from their viewpoint. 
4.4.2 Mechanising Purposiveness 
A more specific controversy of the 
human, animal/machines parallel has been about the 
feasibility of creating purposive automata. The "birth 
certificate of cybernetics" - "Behaviour, Purpose and 
Teleology" [1381 was attacked by Richard Ta ylor in 1951 
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[1391 [1401. More recent contributors include Braithwaite 
[141]. Charles Taylor [1421, Sommerhoff [1431, Woodfield 
[144], Bennett [1451 and Searle [1461. However when 
examining the apparent positions taken or attacked it is 
necessary to be aware of the disputants' tendency to 
qualify their assertions to a degree which if pursued would 
vitiate much of the debate. 
Thus one aspect of the debate seems to be between 
the position that either purpose can be described by 
objective behaviour or that it is entirely a state of 
mind. For example Wiener et. al. define purposeful 
behaviour as what "may be interpreted as directed to the 
attainment of a goal" [1471 (emphasis added), while Taylor 
is willing to accept that there is such a thing as 
purposive behaviour and lay down criteria for it which 
include,, "the behaviour pattern in question" [1481 and 
acknowledge that the "desires and beliefs" which he regards 
as crucial are observable "as inferences from what is 
directly observed" [1491. 
However the continuing debate may be broadly 
characterised by the polarities of describing purpose as 
external behaviour versus internal desire and/or 
calculation. We may grant the force of Taylor's contention 
that, "purposive behaviour, as they describe it, is 
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indistinguishable from any other kind of active 
behaviour"[ 1501 in that any movement towards a stable state 
in accordance with general physical laws has elements of 
finalism. But that observation may in itself help to 
enlarge our understanding of the notion of purposiveness. 
If we acknowledge that there are some observable 
situations that we are more willing to regard as 
purpose-like than others then it is intriguing that we can 
identify a rough hierarchy of increasingly complex 
interaction with features which tend towards what is 
generally regarded as purposive [1511. Research towards the 
mathematical specification of goal directed behaviour can 
be applied in the design of artificial systems; eg. the 
work of Weir [1521 and Chikrii [1531. The emphasis of R 
Taylor and Woodfield on the internal aspect of 
purposiveness while undeniable would have been sterile if 
it had been taken to imply that these internal states were 
not accessible to investigation or modelling. In fact 
results from artificial intelligence workers such as 
Winston have stimulated the growth of cognitive science 
supported by computer use and analogy. Minsky's 
acknowledgements in "The Society of Mind"[1541 provide 
historical evidence of the contributions of cybernetic 
paradigms to A. I. and current cognitive science. 
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Thus while the critics of Rosenblueth, Wiener and 
Bigelow had some reasonable points to make the licence 
which Wiener et. al. gave to scientists to investigate 
processes which smelt of teleology was enormously 
fruitful. For example in psychology it helped to foster 
the study of aspects which had been tabooed as 
mentalistic. 
It should be noted that Wiener et. al. sought to 
change the meaning of the word "teleology" to exclude the 
idea of "final cause"[155] with its taint of a failed 
theory of the origin of species. However the connotation 
seems to have continued to create confusion. Papert sought 
to clarify things with the neologism "teleonomie" - "la 
t6le'onomie etant 'a la tele"ologie comme l'astronomie a* 
astrologie. "[1561 However the distinction between 
appearance and attribution was not picked up in the English 
cybernetics literature. (The word "teleonomy" has been 
used by Medaware, a biologist [1571 and Checkland, a 
systems theorist. [1581) 
An interesting postscript to this controversy is 
provided by Minsky's concepts of 'Idumbell theories" and 
"bridge- definitions". [1591 The initial "internal/external" 
debate provides another example of the cognitive tendency 
to polarise while "bridge-definitions" seem necessary 
for 
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cognitive A. I. systems to be able to handle words for human 
artifacts (eg. chairs, games). A bridge-definition has 
both a purposeful and a structural component. The 
purposeful component alone tends to include too many things 
not intended while the structural component tends to be too 
tight but including both in a word's semantic component 
(eg. the "frames" it can call) is a very useful component 
for a purposive/purpose-like system. This suggests the 
dual-aspect of the concept of purpose itself i. e. 
intention and action and highlights the limitations of 
exclusive attachment to only one end of the dumbell. 
4.4.3 Fuzzy concepts of Feedback 
The concept of feedback itself is ubiquitous but it 
is difficult to specify precise features for all situations 
regarded as embodying feedback. Thus Waldhauer [1601 
quotes Mason and Zimmermann[1611- "A feedback loop is a 
closed chain of dependency, a closed path of signal flow in 
a system diagram. Since the relationships among the signals 
in a given physical system may be represented as any one of 
the number of different systems diagrams, some containing 
feedback loops and some not, it can be argued that the 
presence or absence of "feedback" in the "system" 
is more a 
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matter of viewpoint than 
Nevertheless, many physical 
philosophy of their design, 
diagrams containing loops, and 
comfortable to speak of the p 
a feedback system. " 
of physical reality. 
systems are, by the very 
strongly associated with 
in such cases, we find it 
hysical arrangement itself as 
Beer [1621 makes the point about the role of the 
observer more forcefully for all systems. If we accept the 
force of such arguments two responses are possible. One is 
to refer to Hume's arguments about the general difficulty 
of attributing cause and effect [163] and claim that the 
problem of identifying feedback systems is little worse 
than many other scientific classification problems. The 
other is to follow Beer's dictum that we simply have to 
agree on conventions [164], after which presumably we judge 
their worth by their convenience (ease of comprehension, 
guide to effective intervention, aid to design). 
For example Waldhauer [165] introduces the dilemma 
of the observer in a simple feedback circuit where a 
transistor has a resistance connecting collector to base. 
Some analytic purposes find it convenient to regard this as 
the sole feedback path while others include the 
topologically similar internal capacitance of the collector 
junction - 
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Such items remind us that in any field to which we 
address ourselves the utility of a scientific training may 
lie very much in its ability to provide us with criteria as 
to what we can safely ignore in assessing significance and 
that significance will appear to depena in part on our 
theories and purposes. 
Thus provisionally we shall view feedback as a 
"tool for thought" in Waddington's [1661 use of the 
phrase. 
By way of illustration consider the formal 
similarity between the simplest thermostat circuit and that 
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The two diagrams are virtually identical yet the bell is 
not normally regarded as an example of feedback. Clearly 
we can attempt to argue a distinction in terms of what is 
controlled - the vibrations of air molecules (heat) being 
seen as more external to the system than the 
electro-magnetic field created. However this simply 
emphasises Beer's point that we draw the boundaries of 
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systems very much where we choose. Given that that we 
normally choose to regard the principle output of an 
electric bell as its noise rather than the maintainance of 
some level of electro-magnetic vibration the point is 
re-emphasised that the choice of cybernetic notion is 
muddied by human purposes. 
This may be a problem for the physicist but it is 
an inevitable part of the task for the engineer and an 
unavoidable issue (albeit not only with humans) for many 
biologists. That a science that utilises our awareness of 
purpose can be rigorous is demonstrated at length in 
Simon's "The Sciences of the Artificial" [167). However 
this creates a challenge to clarification rather than an 
acceptable fuzzyness to live with. 
Part of our problem in dealing with such notions as 
feedback lies in broader errors in misconceptions about 
philosophy and language. Thus we tend to try to impose a 
model of the universe appropriate to a world of "medium 
sized dry goods"[1681 in Carnap's phrase. He and Korzybski 
particularly have warned us of the error of regarding any 
word as necessarily having a concrete referent. The 
sentence "the word is not the thing named" is trivially 
obvious once stated, but it is nevertheless part of a 
compound of errors that we easily fall in to when 
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considering process notions. Korzybski in particular 
warned at length of the dangers of taking the 
Subject-Verb-Object linguistic structure too seriously when 
dealing with process notions [169]. His Non-Aristotelian 
General Semantics provides quite a good philosophical 
preparation for anyone preparing to investigate systems and 
cybernetic notions. The overall point however for our 
investigations is simply that some of our problems in 
clarifying feedback stem not from the validity of the 
notion itself but the structure and presuppositions of our 
language. When we use nouns to denote processes paradoxes 
will appear if we insist on using those nouns as if they 
were "medium sized dry goods" with the same 
incontrovertability of reference and lack of alternative 
viewpoint. 
One of the first problems with feedback is 
determining the general range of the notion or deciding 
what part of that spectrum is worth considering. We may 
start with some such core notion as "any situation in which 
a portion of the output is fed back into the input" or note 
Wiener's suitably general "the chain of transmission and 
return of information"[1701. However as we now realise 
"outputs" and "information" are very much in the eye of the 
beholder. Thus as R Taylor hinted any situation which 
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moves towards a finalistic state and would do so with minor 
modifications in its set up may have vectors chosen for its 
state description which make it isomorphic with some level 
of description of feedback. Thus if one wishes one might 
regard the speed and angle of distortion of a pendulum as 
signaling information about an appropriate compensation. 
Elstob [1711 while recognising that one might regard the 
process of a stone rolling downhill as one of information 
exchange in computing the least energetic path, casts doubt 
on the utility of such a viewpoint. 
In considering feedback we may recognise repeated 
dilemmas in science between simplicity, precision and 
generality. The notion of feedback can certainly be 
stretched but it will not always be telling us something 
new. Thus a "feedback" description of the motion of the 
stone in the last paragraph clearly flies in the face of 
Occam's razor. It is hypothetically possible that 
developments in physical theory might make this seem less 
the case; thus Bohm's belief that in micro-particle physics 
informational interactions are prior to energetic 
interactions [1721 would reverse what seemed simpler, if 
accepted; but provisionally we may note interesting 
parallels but refuse to reify them. 
Some cyberneticians seem happier with the notion of 
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it ci rcular causality" rather than feedback. This certainly 
draws our attention to a large class of phenomena, 
virtually any "ongoing situation" with elements of 
iteration: it is of course subject to the criticism of 
being even more general than the notion of feedback. 
However since the circular nature of many interactions are 
frequently missed it is useful to have a phrase which draws 
attention to this. Such a denomination marks out an area 
into which a higher level of formalism eg. recursive 
mathematics or logic, may be introduced without pre-judging 
whether it is best seen as feedback. 
A most interesting discussion of circular causality 
in this context is by Francis Halbwachs-[173] He gives a 
series of examples of reciprocal causality at various 
levels in physics and develops circular causality from a 
finer analysis of the steps in reciprocal situations, 
principally in the interaction of electrical and magnetic 
phenomena. 
In passing he strikingly echoes and develops Mason 
and Zimmerman- "Elle nous montre clairement que nos 
variables conjugees sont en realite des composantes d'une 
meme grandeur vectorielle et que leur distinction en 
facteurs reciproques de la causalite circulaire est 
arbitraire et relative, est due a notre maniere de choisir 
l'origine du temps, n'a pas de fondement dans la nature des 
choses. [1741 
He thus suggests that circular causality is a stage 
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of conceptualisation in between the notion of linear 
causality and the highest level of theoretical abstraction 
and generalisation (explication homogene). This is an 
interesting notion, clearly derived from the Piagetian 
perspective. However that perspective pre-empts 
philosophical difficulties regarding appropriate high level 
perspectives in a way which is not universally accepted 
[175]. For example the priority of grand theory 
explanations over local empirical ones has been questioned 
[1761. 
Halbwachs cites Joan Bliss's work on children's 
understanding of an apparatus exemplifying feedback [1771. 
(Her investigations are partially replicated as part of the 
empirical investigations into individuals' understanding in 
Chapter 6) It is interesting that he claims that full 
understanding is not attained until between 13 and 15 (in 
line with his and Piaget's theories) although Bliss's 
monograph appears to indicate that the fourth and final 
stage of understanding was reached at 11-12 years. 
Inevitably the conclusions drawn from any one 
investigation are open to the criticism of contamination by 
the complexities of the specific apparatus and situation. 
Thus how far was children's understanding of a very 
elementary feedback situation helped or hindered 
by Bliss Is 
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apparatus and specific saliencies which aspects of its 
parts held for them? Would the slightly more sophisticated 
form of negative feedback embodied in a lavatory Is ball 
cock mechanism prove subjectively simpler by virtue of its 
familiarity or, for many, more complex; because of the 
distracting problem of the siphoning mechanism? (A 
simplified apparatus is used to elicit understanding as 
part of Chapter 6) Children vary in their willingness to 
attend to or discuss the aspect of the situation the 
investigator is interested in when they find some other 
aspect which is problematic for themselves. Thus while 
most 11 year olds can grasp the operation of a simple 
thermostat comprehension will be muddied without adequate 
teaching and experience about the explanation of how a 
bi-metalic switch operates. (It is surprisingly difficult 
to rig up large scale apparatus which saliently and 
incontrovertably demonstrates a bi-metalic thermostat 
mechanism. The author has set up bi-metalic feedback 
systems as part of classroom teaching but a considerable 
preamble was necessary to convey the point. Hence a more 
visual heat response device was used where necessary in the 
investigation reported later. ) Other examples of 
children's failure to collaborate with teachers' 
preconceptions as to what is significant in a concrete 
situation concerning communications concepts have 
been 
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listed by the writer elsewhere. [1781 
Thus a key feature is the ability to identify the 
cybernetic feature or generalisation among the "noise" and 
this will depend on the student's data-base of explanations 
for "irrelevant" aspects of the situation as much as on the 
purely abstract formal logical capacities which the 
Piagetians emphasised as the intellectual peak. In the 
classroom experience of this writer the capacity to produce 
more examples of feedback given a few specific cases is 
easier for most 11 to 12 year olds than grasping the 
initial examples whereas the reverse, a deficit in the 
ability to identify and apply a feedback viewpoint over a 
wider range seems to be a problem for many adults. This 
phenomena seems to be exaggerated in group as opposed to 
individual productivity situations, partly at least,, 
presumably for extrinsic social reasons. 
our view of the complexity of evaluating 
understanding is enlarged by the work of Broadbent [1791 
r L1801 and Berry [1811 on the disjunction between verbal and 
operational understanding in some systems of moderate 
complexity involving circular causality. Their finding 
that there could be a significant negative correlation 
between verbal and non-verbal understanding raises 
large 
question marks for the whole of the Piagetian 
data and 
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equally for our grasp of how people encounter problems in 
understanding systems and cybernetic notions. Broadbent 
and Berry's data present us with an image of a somewhat 
modular view of mind in which each module may at some stage 
inhibit the operation of the other. obviously this does 
not preclude the possibility of a higher level integration; 
the experimenters themselves would appear to have been 
capable of this and it might be argued that the unusualness 
of the relationship which effective performers often failed 
to verbalise was simply a function of current educational 
practise and has no fundamental implications as to the 
limits of human cognition. 
various ways of seeing feedback involve shifts in 
perspective the reasoning for which is at present usually 
justified in terms of its utility for the designer or 
analyst. 
Thus Waldhauer [182] as a designer of feedback 
amplifiers promotes a view of feedback in which the input 
is seen as a function of the output. This "anti-causal 
analysis" involves simpler mathematics than the traditional 
feedback equation where output is seen as a function of 
input and is appropriate for a designer who knows what 
output is wanted and is concerned to modify the input. 
Waldhauer claims that his formulation is as intuitively 
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satisfying as the traditional one although acknowledging 
that it takes some getting used to [1831 and providing over 
six hundred pages for the reader to acquire familiarity. 
The realisation that even when viewing a causal loop we 
prefer to start the loop at one place rather than another 
indicates the constraints of our previous conceptual 
experience and possibly our innate predispositions. 
As a contradistinction to Halbwachs' notions we may 
note that Waldhauer finds it convenient to distinguish 
feedback from loop gain and regard the former as the higher 
level more abstract concept [1841. Waldhauer suggests that 
many people find the teleological implications of circular 
causality uncomfortable and therefore he shows that all 
electrical "feedback" circuits can be reduced to signal 
flow graphs which under his "anti-causal" perspective have 
no element of circularity. 
For the time being we may acknowledge that feedback 
can be pointed to in specific situations but that the 
protean nature of our conceptual systems may limit the 
accuracy of any canonical definition despite the notions's 
usefulness. 
However it is worth noticing that most problems 
seem to arise when we seek wider generalisations away 
from 
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the original context of the feedback notion. The concept 
has affinities with recursion and the "common sense" view 
of time itself. To see the world as sets of bounded 
systems or "transformation" devices which simply operate 
algorithmically on inputs to produce outputs is not very 
far from the world of Leibnitzian monads (1851 in which a 
universe specified at time t=0 can be specified for all 
ensuing instances tn... Despite the theoretical 
plausibility of this in a universe of deterministic laws it 
conflicts with our experience as predictors that 
trajectories go awry, or that outcomes affect subsequent 
events i. e. that the best way to predict t=n is to know 
states at t=n-1. Such a view is now bolstered by the 
acceptance of indeterminacy and chaos discoveries that tell 
us that even a deterministic universe can never be 
specified precisely enough to calculate all later states 
accurately from earlier states over a reasonable time 
interval. [1861 Thus any situation where there is no perfect 
long term predictability and outcomes affect subsequents or 
outputs affect inputs is liable to be labelled feedback. 
It may be, vide Halbwachs, that this is simply a stage of 
conceptual development and should properly be followed by a 
restriction of feedback metaphors to situations where 
broader recursive notions provide a less adequate 
characterisation. 
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The link between feedback and more complex 
discoveries about recursive interacting systems is 
highlighted by the notion of variety reduction. Wiener 
hails this aspect of a simple feedback loop as its 
essential utility as a control function; likewise the 
discovery that a plethora of recursively characterisable 
variables operating apparently chaotically in n-dimensional 
phase space will reduce to interaction in low dimensional 
phase space [1871 is simply the generalisation of Wiener's 
original comments. 
Above are some of the problems of conceptualising 
feedback per se. We must also be aware of difficulties 
appreciating the subtleties of its operation; consideration 
of message type, rates of decay, form of transformation and 
media limitations contribute to a variety of potentially 
counter-intuitive effects. Power's program "Introduction 
to Cybernetic Control Theory" [188] which embodies his own 
behavioural theory of perception, is an absorbing attempt 
to overcome some of these counter-intuitive effects. In 
the process he criticises the grasp of some other writers 
on cybernetics. Apart from its apparent target group of 
individuals with at least college level education its only 
limitation as a tool which might investigate concept 
formation is that of any learning using a console, in that 
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it excludes three dimensional exploration of concrete 
artifacts. 
Given the variety of considerations above we feel 
able provisionally to maintain the value of the feedback 
concept as a useful conceptual tool rather than some kind 
of category error. However it will be appreciated that 
empirical cognitive investigations will need to start with 
studies using simple paradigmatic embodiments of feedback. 
4.4.4 The Limits of Information Theory 
We have already alluded to Bar-Hillel's criticism 
of the uses to which Shanon's equations [1891 were put but 
the basic theory itself was not without controversy. 
Mathematicians tended to regard its derivation as 
insufficiently rigorous and it took Kolmogorov's 
championship of its broader ideas to widen its 
acceptability. [1901 [191] Many other attempts to formulate 
acceptable measures of information have been made, notably 
Gabor [192], Wiener [1931, McKay D M. [1941, Carnap and 
Bar-Hillel [1951, Onicescu [1961, hyperbolic methods, time 
and space computational methods [1971. However we may note 
that Padet [1981 in her review of what we may characterise, 
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following Elstob [1991, as p- (physical) information 
measures, concluded that Shannon's formulation had the 
widest range of convenience. 
In his argument for his formulation Shannon [2001 
appeals to our intuition and the usefulness of its 
implications as to what characteristics a measure of 
information should have and builds up the mathematics 
accordingly. The result, as Kolmogorov points out [2011, 
is not a measure which calibrates the information content 
of individual items but a measure which approaches the sum 
of the average informational content of a string of items 
assuming that it is ergodic. 
This is the case partly because of the use of 
probabilistic entities in Shannon's formula (and Kolmogorov 
sought to overcome this objection by replacing the Pi's by 
the length of a "program" calculation) but also because of 
the asymmetry of the curve generated when any function 
between 0 and 1 is multiplied by its logarithm (since this 
must vary between -infinity and 0). Thus the information 
measure of two items summing to p=1 is plausible enough, 
and Shannon himself presents an illustration of such a 
satisfactorily symmetrical distribution. [2021 However when 
we consider that the information measure with p= .5 is the 
same (with log base 2) as that of p= . 25 (viz. 0.5) and 
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that the maximum information level of an element comes at p 
= . 37 (vis. 0.5307) we may acknowledge that the criteria of 
intuitive plausibility are not entirely fulfilled. 
Incidentally the latter objection could be 
satisfied (at the cost of a further element of complexity) 
simply by calculating the informational complement of each 
probability [i. e. -(l-p log2 1-p)] and averaging it with 
-(p log2 p). This would obviously not invalidate the 
developments from Shannon's basic formula nor of course 
would such a modification have any advantage with long 
ergodic time series. 
However more controversy has arisen in cybernetics 
over the ambiguous claims as to the generality of Shannon's 
measure, particularly the claims that it has something 
significant to tell us about human understanding [2031 
rather than just efficient ways of using cables. obviously 
a random series of letters does not contain more 
information (in the everyday use of that word) than the 
same number of letters grouped into words; although on an 
information theoretic basis the opposite is the case. 
Nevertheless viewing the human being as a machine (using 
cables) we are obliged to ask why there is this discrepancy 
rather than to erect a veto on further investigation. 
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Attempts to measure human channel capacity in 
information theoretic terms have revealed a reasonable 
degree of consistency [2041 at least in terms of simple 
sensory inputs. Yet we are faced with Shannon's and 
Ashby's [2051 point that information or variety can only be 
lost or degraded during its successive transformation and 
re-encodement through a system. How then are human beings 
usually regarded as transforming data to extract more 
information? Why should physical and semantic notions of 
information appear to be counterpoised? 
Clearly when we examine features of human 
neurological encoding we can view the successive processes 
of peripheral to central encoding as an organisational 
necessity of a system which needs to select from an 
environment with a virtually infinite set of differentiae 
(viewed either physically or informationally is irrelevant 
and anyway mathematically isomorphic) those features which 
require a response to permit its continued existence or 
maintainance of whatever state trajectory it may be 
interpreted as pursuing. (Information pathways embody a 
restriction as well as a potential extention of 
interaction. ) 
Thus the successive loss of redundant p-information 
leads to a higher quality of organismically useful 
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information, approaching the semantic everyday language 
notion of information. Such considerations draw our 
attention to the significance of the encoding or decoding 
process between levels of complex information processing 
systems as they transform "raw" information into 
progressively larger chunks. The hierarchy of language 
complexity that we are familiar with in computers has been 
used as the parallel for theories of mind by Hofstadter 
[2061 and Minsky [2071 and is corroborated in particular by 
our knowledge of visual information processing. 
We can clarify this interpretation by focussing on 
Kolmogorov's emphasis on conditional entropy [208) H (x I 
y) where y stands for an information processor analogous to 
or actually a decoder dependant on a data base, x is the 
physical information inflow and the whole equation 
represents its informational value to the system. 
To dwell upon the semantic relationship this would 
mean that reconfiguring the decoder-data base so that input 
information was transformed to larger and fewer chunks 
would lead to a reduction in subjective complexity and in 
strict p-information theoretic terms to a reduction in 
information at that stage of the processing. Hence the 
apparent paradox that the better the system's model of its 
environment the less the value (information content) of any 
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new item of data and the greater the information content of 
any element predicted by the decoder-data base as being 
improbable. 
Cognitive development could be seen as the 
elaboration of the decoder-data base device(s) and the 
crucial feature of redundancy at each level of information 
processing may be recognised as an essential feature to 
permit classification of similarities and differences in 
the data flow so that less information is needed for 
decision making by the next stage as the previous filter 
becomes more complex and efficient. 
Clearly we are far from being able to measure the 
complexity of the filters, decoders, data bases in the 
human brain (although it would be less difficult in the 
early steps of processing) and therefore the measure of 
subjective semantic information is elusive but the above 
analysis does suggest that the relationship between p and s 
information is non-trivial and remains a worthwhile area 
for development. 
At a broader philosophical level such "discoveries" 
as those hailed by members of the Turing Institute 
[2091,, 
that the universe is a computer, can be seen as a 
combination of awkward intellectual moves. Certainly we 
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may view physical phenomena (i. e. whatever we can 
physically discriminate) in informational terms. Since the 
mathematical formula for entropy and information is the 
same and the matter/information entity has the same 
operational consequencies we may recognise that its 
classification is not intrinsic but a function of its 
impact on a receiving system. (Thus the same quantum of 
light may induce a sensation which is interpreted as 
information when falling on the retina but simply 
stimulates an increase in melanin or triggers a melanoma 
elsewhere on the body surface. ) Also any universe which 
operates according to a set of laws which can be expressed 
mathematically may be regarded as indulging in finalistic 
behaviour which is homomorphic with the process of 
calculation. Naturally when the universe does not behave 
perfectly predictably (or one's characterisation of the 
laws is still inadequate) one may characterise the computer 
(pace Deutsch) [210] as containing the best possible random 
number generator. 
To be able to produce a fairly consistent view of 
the world does not mean to say that it is efficient; there 
are no logical inconsistencies in our viewpoint when we 
stand on our head. What such considerations may suggest is 
that all useful notions have a limited range of convenience 
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and that to stretch them too far may encourage others to 
challenge their usefulness even within their original 
territory. 
4.4.5 The Status of Requisite Variety 
The statement that, " only variety can absorb 
variety': a regulating system must be able to generate as 
many states as can the system regulated" [ 2111 challenges us 
to look for apparent counter-examples. These might 
include; the restriction of the behaviour of a large group 
by a person with a gun, the control of a relatively complex 
organism by a relatively simple virus, the modification of 
the output of a computer by the triggering of a sprinkler 
system or simply the flick of a binary switch. Beer's 
algedonic controls [212] appear to override the variety 
dilemma in the control of large systems. Nevertheless 
Ashby claims that his law is of "very general 
applicability" and summarises albeit 'picturesquely' "only 
variety can destroy variety" [2131. In contrast Checkland 
has criticised the concept as being trivial in 
organisational practise [2141 and Jantsch's objections were 
mentioned in section 3 of this chapter. 
- 84 - 
It is worth examining the assumptions that lead to 
Ashby's conclusion. Ashby argues from a model of one 
system trying to control another where the possibilities 
are represented as a table in which the available "moves" 
of the controled system are listed along a vertical axis 
and those of the controling system are listed on a 
horizontal axis. A matrix of outcomes for all combinations 
of moves or states is given to represent "the hard external 
world. "[215] However Ashby excludes for the sake of his 
argument matrices with certain properties, specifically 
those which make the controller's game, "too easy to be of 
interest"[2161 i. e. where a certain response from the 
controller will bring the same outcome with more than one 
(possibly all) of the controlled system s states, which 
would mean, more significantly, that the controller needed 
a lower level of information about the controlled system's 
previous state than Ashby goes on to consider. More 
briefly, Ashby excludes matrices where an outcome occurs 
more than once in a column (the controler's responses 
occupying the horizontal axis, the controlee's states the 
vertical). 
Thus Ashby's initial examples in no way deny the 
possibility that a simple system may control a more complex 
one. Sometimes the hard external world is like that and 
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arguably it might be most productive to seek to identify 
such situations. However having effectively excluded such 
situations Ashby is then able to deduce that when excluded 
they do not occur. Unfortunately various commentators seem 
to ignore the situations which Ashby excluded and proceed 
to argue as if all control situations belonged to Ashby's 
selected set. Thus when Ashby argues that the control of 
Hitler over Germany was not total this may be true but to 
derive it from a statement that his control amounted to 
"just one man-power and no more"[2171 is to court 
meaninglessness or self delusion in denying the efficacy of 
a very interesting control situation. 
Another way of looking at the same facts is to 
state that Ashby's notion of full control embodies the idea 
of the controler being able to make a differential response 
to every possible state of the control system. Frequently 
this is neither necessary or desired; consider the computer 
command IF X>1 THEN ... Here the many possible states of 
the controlled system are collapsed into only two from the 
point of view of the controller. An analogous situation 
arises with many simple feedback loops. Thus Ashby's 
conditions may seem to be fulfilled from the discriminating 
capacity of the controler but not that of the controllee. 
This issue is exemplified in controversies about central 
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government 
universities. 
capacity to influence the output of 
Thus we need to ask how large is the class of 
actual or potential control or regulation relationships in 
which Ashby's special conditions apply or are close enough 
to be useful. They can be accepted in the kind of 
communication channel relationships assumed in Shannon's 
Tenth Theorem and have some plausibility in human 
relationships where there is no power differential and the 
influencer, say a teacher, wishes to be able to adjust to 
all the possible responses of the influenced. In 
management the variety explosion created by Ashbian 
assumptions about interaction draws our attention to the 
need for some non-Ashbian matrices of control relationships 
for the institution to survive. Ashby's law does leave us 
with the useful empirical principle that it is frequently 
impossible (and pointless) to seek to control absolutely 
everything in a system but that does not absolve us in any 
specific situation from enquiring whether the matrix of 
outcomes of controller acting on controlled is really 
Ashbian or not. 
Stewart has pointed out [2181 that Ashby's 
formulation is inferior to Shannon's Tenth Theorem in that 
it does not take on board the question of with what degree 
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of probability any state by controller or controllee can be 
played. 
From an even broader viewpoint it has been pointed 
out [2191 that the identification of states in the 
controlled system and the controlling one can be rather 
subjective. This might enable one to maintain 
"empirically" that all controlled systems were Ashbian, 
possibly Ashby's suggestion that the states of the 
controlled system may be 'vectors' that are responded to 
does this, but it would not give one a priori criteria to 
make the law work nor would it remove the fundamental 
tautology. 
The notion of variety reduction may be regarded as 
a useful expansion of the concept of stability but 
requisite variety is only a part of the set of strategies 
which may achieve it. 
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Chapter 5 
Avenues to the Cognition of Cybernetic Concepts 
Having examined problems of the relationship of 
cybernetic concepts and the validity of key concepts in 
themselves, and found some difficulties in the formulation 
of some of them, the next logical step is to consider how 
cybernetic concepts come to b'e understood and how such 
cognitive processes might be most appropriately 
investigated. Also we need a comparative base to identify 
what is and is not unique to cybernetics. All this 
requires an examination of fields to which the cognition of 
cybernetic problems might relate or from which 
investigational techniques might be extracted. 
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5.1 overview 
A variety of avenues of research suggest themselves 
as paradigms to investigate cognition of cybernetic 
concepts. Some fall into groups or have obvious links; 
others are more disparate. of obvious relevance are the 
theories of Piaget and the post Piagetians who combine 
developmental interests with "clinical" methodology and a 
predisposition for large scale theories of cognitive 
"levels". The later links with Jaques' theory of levels of 
abstraction [221] [2221, while both authors are 
counterpoised by Dienes '[2231 emphasis on the limited 
ability to apply a capacity for abstraction in one domain 
to any others, despite his having done some similar 
investigations with children to Piaget. vygotsky [2241 and 
the neo-Vygotskians [2251 share broad developmental 
theorising with Piaget but introduce a wider social and 
pedagogic emphasis. 
The emphasis on the learner's own conceptions and 
strategies on his or her own higher level 
learning 
effectiveness is illustrated by Pask [226] and Thomas 
[2271 
and a variety of more "micro-theoretical" writers. 
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The relatively recently developing f ield of 
discourse analysis [2281 suggests not only ways of 
analysing cybernetics' similarity with other subjects but 
also differences in the ways it is perceived by individuals 
obliged to talk or write about cybernetic concepts. The 
concept of macro-structures [2291 which has arisen 
primarily from discourse analysis provides a possible 
conceptual model for the problem of identifying the 
structure of cybernetic topics. 
At a slightly lower conceptual level generally but 
sharing some common structural ideas the A. I. theories 
which have contributed to the body of work denominated 
"cognitive science" and are characterised by "frames" and 
"scripts", for example Minsky [2301, provide another 
language in which to conceptualise the processing of 
systems concepts. At what is generally regarded as a more 
micro-level still the contributions to cognitive science of 
the connectionists and parallel processers [2311 have 
relevance to some of the issues in the development of 
cybernetic concepts; while the validity of both the list 
processing and parallel distributed processing approaches 
is supported by developments in neurophysiology. 
To separate traditional cognitive psychology from 
cognitive science is largely a convenient taxonomic 
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fiction. However those elements of cognitive psychology 
and learning theory that do not uti-L lise computer science, 
connectionism or linguistics might be expected to produce a 
relatively limited set of ideas for understanding how we 
grasp systems and cybernetic concepts, since their 
traditionally 'bottom up" approach to how we understand 
things has meant a greater emphasis on more basic 
psychological processes and an unwillingness to deal with 
more complex processes until basic ones are clearer. 
However the development of that tradition (albeit 
influenced by cognitive science) by Broadbent and Berry 
(op. cit. ) in their (already mentioned) work on the apparent 
paradoxes in people's understanding of complex processes 
shows that mainstream psychological methodology has plenty 
to offer in enabling us to investigate how cybernetic 
concepts are understood. 
Psychological studies of cognition at equivalent 
levels to cybernetics eg. maths and the sciences taught in 
schools provide a final area of relevance to our quest. 
Among these the work of Hacker [2321 arid Hart 2331 are 
particularly enlightening. 
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5.2 Developmental Macrotheorists 
This heading is merely a convenient 
characterisation of the group of authors referred to in the 
first paragraph of the previous section although some 
merely highlight or provide a critique of such theorists. 
The largest body of work in cognition is still that 
published by Piaget and his collaborators (and critics). 
Some of the implications of his work for the understanding 
of cybernetic concepts were discussed in my Msc 
dissertation [234] out of which some of the problems 
addressed in this thesis arose. The broad message of 
Piaget is generally taken as being that cognitive 
development proceeds in at least three stages: 
sensory-motor, till about 18 months; concrete operational 
(sometimes split in two), till say 11 or 12 years, where 
thinking is still restricted to situations in which the 
child has performed similar physical acts on things, and 
lastly formal operational, which embodies the capacity for 
abstract logical thought exemplified in the intelligent 
adult. 
Initially one might assume that systems concepts 
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required a fairly high degree of abstraction, depending on 
the ability to see a chain or network of similar 
dependencies within a variety of disparate structures and 
situations, frequently with the ordering of dependencies 
being not merely linear or reciprocal but recursive. Hence 
Piaget's theory would suggest that a grasp of cybernetic 
concepts would be unlikely before the age of 12 but that 
once formal operational thinking had developed the field 
should be generally accessible. 
However Piaget's theory can deal with exceptions 
where the capacity for a particular level of thought in 
some area emerges earlier or later than predicted. It uses 
such concepts as task resistance and horizontal decalage 
(the French verb means to stagger, unwedge or displace). 
[2351 But such flexibility weakens the strength of the 
theory. Thus without any predictions of when exceptions 
will occur the theory only indicates what may happen, with 
no significant change if the opposite occurs. The weak 
interpretation of the theory still leaves intact the notion 
that the key to higher level concepts may lie in attaining 
a succession of logical levels of abstraction. 
A key concept for Piaget which might survive the 
rejection of the notion of stages, though less probably 
that of cognitive levels, is the concept of egocentrism 
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[2361 or its converse decentering. [2371 This refers to the 
child's ability to see things firstly independently of its 
own immediate actions and perspective and see things from 
another's viewpoint or any hypothetical viewpoint. 
Decentering involves the capacity to move away from only 
performing physical operations or mental operations on 
physical objects (to hand or in vision) towards the ability 
to perform mental operations on imagined objects or 
situations, classes of such and eventually on mental 
operations themselves. 
Whatever the status of Piaget's theorising in his 
recorded conversations with children, (what he described as 
a "clinical" method) there is a wealth of raw data. Such 
data it has been suggested gives more insight than the 
typical experimental paradigm where the permitted verbal 
response is highly restricted and statistical significance 
is gained at the expense of any other kind. [2381 
However theories about levels of cognitive 
development are not exclusive to Piaget. Jacques and his 
co-workers [2391 have produced a theory of (about five) 
levels of adult cognitive functioning related to capacity 
for useful organisational work. Stamp [2401 cites Bennett 
in maths, Bloom in education and Kohlberg (inaccurately 
[2411) in moral development, as all having arrived at a 
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five level theory of huntan capacities. Jacques claims that 
his finding that five is the optimal number of layers for 
most large organisations reflects five fundamental human 
levels of capacity to make abstractions. one might note 
that Beer [2421 arrived at five layers for his optimal 
viable system and that Peters [2431 independently concludes 
that no organisation needs more than five levels. However 
such a consensus may be merely numerological or perhaps a 
reflection of limited human channel capacity in making 
distinctions [2441 unless links can be made between 
individuals' performance at specific levels across 
different fields. 
Unfortunately the evidence so far is equivocal. 
Isaac and OýConnor [2451 succeed in showing a multimodal 
distribution of performance scores in certain test 
situations. However the mode an individual falls into on 
one test is unrelated to the mode on another. The attempt 
to link score performance with subjective behavioural 
observations of strategy linked to each of the five levels 
[246] is interesting but would require more and clearer 
data to substantiate. Stamp suggests that at level three 
the capacity emerges to relate disparate elements together 
into a system and Isaac and O'Connor suggest that about 
half the school population have reached level three by 
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twelve,, the majority still being there at sixteen. [2471 
Isaac, O'Connor and Gibson hypothesise a series of levels 
of abstraction and co-ordination of abstractions which 
typify each level. However until we can analyse the 
abstraction requirements of a task and then predict the 
performance of an individual at a certain level or mode at 
that task we need to treat such theorising as a possible 
guide but unproven. 
In contrast to highly structured theories about 
general conceptual levels where it turns out to be 
impossible to Predict what conceptual level an individual 
will be on in a particular instance is Dienes emphasis on 
the extreme difficulty and particularity of abstraction and 
generalisation. [2481 [2491 The significance of his approach 
is shown less in subsequent citations than in the ubiquity 
of his enabling equipment, "Dienes Blocks" in primary 
schools. Generally he states learning involves, "not 
personai, psychodynamic, superimposed concepts but is 
associative; children associate situations with certain 
processes and operate the processes in situations with 
which the processes have been associated. " 
His prescription is simple, abstractions will be 
made more effectively through a greater range of 
explorations with different concrete exemplars of the 
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abstract concept which is to be grasped. The greater the 
range of experience the less the probability of partial or 
overinclusive or inappropriate abstraction and the greater 
the probability of appropriate generalisation to other 
situations. [2501 The structure of development is not 
greatly different he suggests with the creative 
mathematician developing new concepts [2511, although 
appropriate practise in abstraction and class inclusion 
(generalisation) can in itself lead to a mental set for the 
process which speeds up the discovery of isomorphisms. 
[2 52 1 
Dienes touches on the phenomena of people 
apparently using abstractions and generalisations, either 
through formal symbols or language, for whom the original 
content is either severely etiolated or lost sight of [2531 
although this may not be immediately apparent to an 
interlocutor. The writer has been struck by the frequency 
of the false assumption, by conversationalists at all 
academic levels, that particular words have the same range 
of connotations for both. 
Dienes emphasis on the utility of specific 
interventions in the teaching process to aid conceptual 
development contrasts with the view of many Piagetians who 
regard conceptual development as driven by a child's own 
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autonomous activities making particular learning relatively 
straightforward at the right stage and earlier teaching 
futile. Vygotsky's ideas have had an increasing influence 
recently due to their emphasis on the idea that what is 
learnable depends on the physical and conceptual tools of 
the society in and with which the child operates and the 
demands made by the teacher. [2541 [2551 
The point about the link between language and tools 
in human (mental) evolution is made repeatedly at present 
by palaeoethnologists [2561. Vygotsky instances such 
practices as counting on fingers and joints for 
understanding of number, learning of writing for a more 
reflective symbolic understanding of speech, [2571 and 
aides memoires such as knot tying [2581 and pictures [2591 
as ways in which culturally produced sign systems are 
internalised to aid thought processes. At a more diffuse 
cultural level he acknowledges Engels as the originator of 
the idea that the social context of tool use influences the 
ideas that individuals are likely to develop. [2601 
The social and intellectual influence of adults is 
first highlighted by Vygotsky when he points out that the 
proportion of egocentric speech (which Piaget emphasises as 
typical of the first five years) declines according to the 
availability Or the adult for interaction and increases 
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with the intellectual demands of the situation. [2611 More 
generally his notion of the "zone of proximal development" 
denotes the existence of an area,, "between the actual 
developmental level as determined by independent problem 
solving and the level of potential development as 
determined through problem solving under adult guidance or 
in collaboration with more capable peers. " [2621 Thus 
vygotsky regards it as appropriate for school learning and 
instruction to be somewhat in advance of children's 
cognitive development. 
5.3 Learner Self-Modeling of Learning Processes 
The theorists in the last section all at some stage 
refer to the increasing capacity of learners to handle 
concepts as they become more aware of ways manipulating 
learning material as such and their relation to it. 
Conscious development of such abilities has been the theme 
of many study skills advocates, for example Mace [2631, 
Rowntree [2641 and Buzan [265]. However in a review of 
research on the effectiveness of such taught skills Biggs 
[2661 points out that there is no straightforward 
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relationship between use or non-use of such skills and 
success or failure although there does seem to be an 
interaction between the type of study approach used, the 
mode of assessment and the the student's personality, 
values and ability which more accurately predicts success. 
To a considerable extent openness to such an 
orientation is the theoretical starting point of Pask and 
Thomas [2671 Both obviously share a commitment to certain 
cybernetic ideas and for both there is an intimate link 
between theories of experimental methodology, cognition, 
learning and effective (self) instruction. Pask asserts 
the conversational nature of both a realistic experimental 
paradigm and the teaching/learning situation and each have 
developed their own basically similar conversation 
theories. Both use various technological or conceptual 
tools to elicit from learners their view of the universe of 
discource and encourage a "conversation" on that to 
facilitate understanding. A conversation may be viewed as 
an interaction between two persons, a person and machine or 
within one person (or machine), (and in theory more 
agglomerated entities). 
For example Pask identifies certain common 
strategies for the material he presents, namely "serialist" 
and "wholist" and shows that material matched to the 
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learner's dominant strategy is learned better. However 
some learners could be moved to a more "versatile" [2681 
style adjusted to the particular nature of the material and 
some arrived at the experimental/learning situation able to 
use a mixture of styles appropriately. 
While Pask's work concentrates on helping the 
learner move around specific knowledge structures educed 
from experts Thomas generally deals with wider fields of 
learning and the conversational interaction is usualiy less 
constrained. The emphasis is generally on getting learners 
to examine the effectiveness of their own approach and on 
modeling their own learning processes. obviously both 
writers are clear that conversations can take place at a 
variety of levels from the most specific facts to the most 
general strategies and meanings. 
To apply Pask's approach lock stock and barrel to 
cybernetics would involve the e1icitation of "entailment 
structures" from a variety of experts, an enormous task for 
which aspects of this thesis provide a preliminary 
approach. Pask emphasises that there may be an infinite 
number of legitimate entailment structures even when there 
is general agreement on the field. Thomas and 
Harri-Augstein's repertory grids for areas which the 
student finds problematic has obvious uses; however 
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problems perceived (or not perceived) by students do not 
necessarily reflect those judged to exist by lecturers and 
a limited use of such methodology might lead to an elision 
over certain student problems. At a higher level if the 
teacher's authoritative view of the subject matter were to 
some degree rescinded it could lead to precisely the 
dilemmas of conceptualisation and interpretation which are 
addressed as a part of this thesis. 
Nevertheless there is an obvious influence of the 
themes of Pask, Thomas and their co-workers in the method 
of data collection used in the next chapter. 
5.4 Discourse analytic approaches 
There has been an increasing amount of attention 
among linguists to larger linguistic structures than simply 
the grammar of the sentence [2691. Initially this attended 
principally to elucidating the structure of dialogues and 
simple narratives such as children's stories. Basic 
underlying features were found to be operating which 
suggested a larger scale analogy with Chomsky's posited 
"language acquisition device" [2701 [2711 which posited 
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innate "deep structure" recognition devices which enabled 
us to operate a grammatical structure although the "surface 
structures" used were obviously specific to particular 
languages. 
Winter [2721 from an analysis of percentages of 
different types of links between adjacent sentences argued 
that scientific writing had a distinctive semantic 
structure. However simply counting the number of 
connective adverbs denoting, - logical sequence (eg. thus 
therefore), contrast (yet however), doubt/certainty 
(probably clearly) and the less frequent categories 
identified can only give a superficial analysis of 
structure and inevitably ignores the structure of 
relationships between non-adjacent clauses or sentences. 
Hoey [2731 provides a technique which demonstrates 
coherence and elicits structure over a paragraph or two. 
However such objective techniques are laborious. [2741 To 
analyse ten short scientific passages can provide the 
essential content of a Ph. D. thesis [275j. Moreover 
similarities in style and structure tend to be intuitively 
obvious so that while it is useful to know that such 
notions can have an objective reference they probably do 
not in themselves provide the most economical approach to 
identifying either the cohesion, structure, uniqueness or 
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similarity of cybernetic texts. Thus while observer 
evaluations are justifiable on the grounds that they are 
open to disconfirmation such estimations of homomorphism 
are probably only significant in the context of additional 
supporting material. 
However given the evidence that such structures are 
"computable" linguists have pointed to higher order 
semantic structures. Hoey [2761 gives evidence of 
structure between paragraphs and van Dijk's concept of 
macrostructures [2771 offers an approach to eliciting more 
global semantic relationships. (It should be noted that 
van Dijk distinguishes macrostructures, which are semantic 
from superstructures which pertain to schematic "form" 
e. g. the "summary, aim, method, results, discussion, 
conclusion" format of s ome scientific papers. Although 
o 4: - superstructures are 3- interest in themselves a 
macrostructure would embody such intuitive notions as 
"gist", "theme" or "topic". ) Van Dijk speculates that the 
formation of macrostructures could be either linear or 
parallel and concludes that it is linear but that 
representations are hierarchical [2781. Hoey [2791 supports 
an opposite conclusion about global text organisation, 
minimising the extent of hierarchical organisation and 
emphasising cross links somewhat reminiscent of Pask's 
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network-like entailment structures. Until facilities are 
available to process texts automatically and perform a 
deeper analysis than the relatively elementary automatic 
parsers at present available progress in proving such 
contentions will be slow, and it will be just as laborious 
to establish similarities or differences between cybernetic 
and other texts or concepts as was suggested in chapter 
two. 
5.5 Cognitive Science Approaches: A. I. and Information 
processing 
Cognitive science may be regarded as traditional 
cognitive psychology enriched particularly by concepts from 
linguistics and computer science in its broadest terms. 
The demand that theories be potentially simulable on 
computer has brought greater rigour into theorising and 
although a person is clearly not the same as any currently 
functioning computer it may be the best metaphor we have. 
Thus one could begin by asking how one might create 
a computer like mechanism which would simulate a facility 
with cybernetic concepts. The immediate caveat would have 
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to be that at some level of simulation the performance 
could be achieved in an infinite variety of ways. There is 
no necessary relation between computer architecture and the 
output of a program. Knowing the input and output does not 
enable one to deduce the construction of the computer, and 
to a less obvious extent the same applies to the 
construction of the program. Simon's argument that the 
human intellective component may be relatively simple and 
that apparent complexity may be driven by the environment 
[2801 also suggests that we may benefit from considering 
task requirements at a fairly abstract level rather than 
worrying too much about feasible performance mechanisms, 
but such an argument is not proven. Nevertheless despite 
such considerations one can hypothesise about problems 
likely to arise and indicate certain classes of solution. 
Such an analysis at least alerts us to the possibility that 
actual individuals may successfully arrive at and handle 
cybernetic concepts in different ways. 
Another consideration is that many A. I. and 
computer science concepts imported into cognitive science 
are themselves closely related to or exemplars of 
cybernetic concepts so that there is a danger of a circular 
process of reification if the separate levels are not 
rigorously kept sight of. A further level of circularity 
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is suggested by Norman [2811 in that the institution of Von 
Neumann architecture was influenced by the then current 
ideas of how the mind operated. 
Arguably the range of plausible models is pruned by 
the principle that human cognitive systems have been 
subject to the constraints of evolution and growth 
demanding their viability at each stage of development and 
also by what we actually know neurologically although 
George [2821 pointed out that simply by conceptualising 
some area of the cortex as a set of uncommitted flip flops 
one had an available mechanism to model any system which 
one was able to specify. Such proofs of neural potential 
and plasticity are likely to be constrained by 
considerations of computing time however, when one moves 
from abstract principie to practical example. 
Munro's discussion of plasticity in relationship to 
the concept of critical periods for particular perceptual 
and cognitive developments [2831 argues from his model 
that, "increasingly longer sensitive periods may be 
expected for the development of higher cognitive 
functions". This would corroborate the possibility that if 
postponed too long the introduction of cybernetic concepts 
could meet with greater difficulty although obviously too 
early an introduction of higher abstractions creates 
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If then one posits as a major goal of cybernetic 
understanding the ability to construe similarities in 
processes between different organisations one is faced with 
the need for feature abstractors, a coder of relationships 
between features which is capable of development, a device 
for comparing patterns of relationships between different 
organisations and a large data base. These minimal 
requirements are no different from the requirements of any 
concept forming device capable of abstraction and 
generalisation although we may argue that such demands are 
greater in cybernetics than in most areas and note that 
however easy it is to state the broad features of a system 
which construes cybernetic conceptsr common sense and 
psychological research tell us that people are not 
generally very good at high levels of abstraction. 
Even assuming that initial feature extraction was 
not problentatic a hypothetical program could obviously not 
code for all the relationships between features, hold the 
infinity of derivable patterns and then test each new 
collection of features (however that was bracketed) for the 
occurence of all previously derived patterns. Clearly with 
simple serialist techniques there is a computational 
complexity explosion to identifying new sets of patterns on 
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higher levels, except to some extent where those patterns 
are simply a reapplication of previously recognised 
patterns at a new level (which fortunately is all that is 
required in some situations, but this has its dangers). 
With elementary connectionist models the analogous 
point arises that it is physically impossible to connect 
all basic modules, and indeed some degree of isolation is 
generally necessary for their effective functioning [2841. 
Hence it is unsurprising that conceptual development seems 
to be guided by such principles as propinquity and 
co-variation. Thus the more widely distributed the 
elements of a system the greater the cognitive demands. 
Also the usual usefulness of strong "co-variation filters" 
suggest links with the frequent human intuitive weaknesses 
relating to concepts of probability, correlation and 
confirmation bias. When the principle of propinquity is 
considered at the level of successively higher 
relationships it becomes obvious that whatever the 
theoretically "raw" input or "elementary data" (theoretical 
fictions) it becomes clear that major reformulations of a 
system's conceptual framework is going to demand greater 
computational costs than modifications or straightforward 
reapplications of existing frames or schemas. 
The same appears to be true of connectionist 
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systems which emphasise their dispersed nature. Thus for 
holographic and hologram like systems [2851 proposing 
information storage through interference effects, 
previously stored information is reaccessed through 
similarities in the present input pattern, a process making 
for the consolidation of previous concepts, interpreting 
the new in terms of the old though not inherently 
prohibiting the creation of new formulations by inspecting 
and separating out elements of earlier data. 
Likewise Edelman's selectionist theory of 
distributed neural networks [2861 depends on development 
from previously familiar input patternings. Rumelhart, 
Hinton and McClelland [287] state that non-hierarchical 
structures are in principle better problem solvers than 
hierarchical ones. However the acceptability of their 
arguments about the restriction of interaction in 
hierarchical systems possibly rests on a narrow conception 
of problem solving which only for example considers the 
specific relatively elementary situation requiring solution 
rather than the choice of what problem is to be solved and 
frequently the sequential activation of problem solvers 
towards a solution. The paradigm of a PDP system relaxing 
towards a solution through iteratively seeking to satisfy a 
large number of weak constraints may allow for initial 
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relatively arbitrary connections 
generalisations are rather too easi 
recognition structures and there is 
similar elements separate. [2881 The 
suggests a degree of fuzziness in our 
(cybernetic) concept. 
to be made but 
ly made from existing 
a problem of keeping 
relaxation model also 
understanding of any 
Clearly Simon's arguments as to the evolutionary 
advantage of loosely hierarchical systems [2891 apply both 
to the cognitive structure of the nervous system and to the 
ease with which loosely hierarchical concepts are cognised 
by that system. Given the ubiquity with which such 
structures are encountered (eg. biological growth, fractal 
concepts, "viable systems" [2901, the evolution of matter 
[2911) a biased nervous system may be an advantage but the 
point that it would present difficulties for the emergence 
of other novel viewpoints still stands and could lead to a 
glossing over of the subtleties of interaction in extant 
loose hierarchies. 
Given the forgoing overview it is unsurprising that 
cognitive science has not yet addressed itself to the 
instantiation of specifically cybernetic concepts although 
it may modify our expectations of what is easy and 
difficult. 
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5.6 Experimental Approaches Relevant to the Coqnition of 
Cybernetic Concepts 
The range of experiments relevant depends mainly on 
ones presuppositions or speculations about the elements of 
cybernetic understanding. As already indicated too 
microscopic a view might be at the wrong level of 
understanding. Thus there are plenty of experiments about 
how elementary associations are made and concepts formed, 
none with unambiguous implications for higher order concept 
formation. Richardson [2921 reviewing experiments of 
concept formation concluded that while the weight of 
opinion was that concepts were coded on the basis of the 
independent cues or elements composing them, given the 
opportunity, it was relationships between elements that 
were coded. Richardson demonstrated this reasonably well 
with his own experimental stimuli but all we can conclude 
from the data is the probable plasticity between modes of 
cognition for the same input. Pask's comments on the 
impact of the subject's personal interpretation of the 
experimental situation [2931 on what we can deduce from the 
responses apply increasingly where the subject may have 
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some degree of conscious control. 
Closer to the processes we are considering is the 
work of Berry [2941 and Broadbent [295] and others [2961 
briefly mentioned in chapter 4 section 3.3. Their series of 
experiments has involved subjects interacting with a 
computer model of a complex system, for example; a city 
transport system, the economy of a country, a sugar factory 
and human interaction. Typically one or two input 
variables were involved in controling one or two output 
variables. The output variables would be some function 
combining the input variables previousLy chosen, possibly 
lagged, so that the relationship was not immediately 
obvious. The recurring feature was that performance in 
actually controlling the model was negatively correlated 
with a capacity for verbal description of the relationship 
operating. Broadbent suggests that there may be a conflict 
between implicit and explicit learning in understanding a 
system although both can be involved in a complex learning 
task. He proposes that implicit learning (possibly by 
building up in parallel large numbers of contingencies 
available in some internal "look-up table") comes into play 
increasingly "as tasks become more complex and as the 
number of possible alternative hypotheses which require 
evaluation becomes unmanageable. " [2971 The salience (lack 
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of lag between input and output) was one factor encouraging 
explicit learning and which correlated with operational 
ability and with situations where there was transfer 0 
training. Only instruction as to which variables to 
concentrate on improved performance where relationships 
were non-salient. 
Berry and Broadbent's implicit/explicit dimension 
was introduced earlier by, among others, Dienes (2981 who 
suggested that "internal dissection" of one's own insights 
encouraged the explicit mode and the search for practical 
application the implicit mode. He went on to suggest these 
two strategies were linked to the development of 
mathematicians as either formalists or constructive 
intuitionists. Vygotsky reports how young children who 
could not verbalise the actions and relationships among 
objects in a picture were well able to communicate the 
dynamic features in pantomime. [2991 
Recent experiments on complex learning by Shute 
et. al. [3001, in which students interacted with a computer 
program to discover principles of economics in a micro 
economic environment, showed large individual differences 
in what was learned. The most successful used a variety of 
strategies relevant to the tasks in order to test the 
degree of generalisability in related situations. However 
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different researches in the same volume suggest the 
idiosyncratic nature of complex learning according to the 
learner and the particular tasks [3011. 
Another interesting study relevant to the cognition 
of cybernetic concepts is that of Finnie, "is top down 
natural? Some experimental results from non-procedural 
languages. "[3021 It concluded that the kind of global 
thinking required for top down programming did not come 
naturally to novices and that "top down" was inappropriate 
for short programs. However it was characteristic of 
experts who tended to "chunk" more in writing a program. 
Bliss and Piaget's investigation of children's 
understanding of a positive feedback situation [3031 also 
mentioned in chapter 4 section iii is the most direct 
investigation of a cybernetic concept. The children viewed 
an apparatus in which marbles zig-zagged down four 
stretches of slope but their release was controlled by a 
pivot bar stretching from the upper to the lower slope so 
that when a marble struck the bar on the lower slope it 
released the next marble at the top slope. (For a 
photograph of a replication of this apparatus see page 
135. ) The simple point that the marb1e hitting the bar at 
the bottom caused the next marble to be released was 
reportedly understood by children from the age of seven or 
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eight although Bliss and Piaget were not satisfied with 
their explanation of the fact that the pivot bar swings 
back to its resting position under gravity. Until the age 
of eleven or twelve they were not happy with children's 
explanations of how something which happened at the bottom 
could cause an event at the top; however it could be argued 
that what they sought to elicit went beyond an 
understanding of the basic circularity of the process. 
(This investigation was discussed on PP21 and 22 of 
Dewhurst's M. Sc. dissertation op. cit. ) 
g) Investigations oriented towards higher level 
academic understanding 
We may also look for guidance on how people grasp 
cybernetic ideas in the work of writers concerned with how 
(mainly) secondary pupils grasp concepts in other 
subjects. 
Hart [3041 led a team studying secondary pupils' 
grasp of maths concepts using about ten thousand children 
in fifty four schools and extensive interviewing. They 
collected a wealth of pedagogic data about common 
misconceptions within particular maths topics and a few 
loose but useable generalisations. They sought, by a 
variety of criteria, to group secondary maths performance 
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into conceptual levels in each of nine topic areas. [3051 In 
some topics they found an obvious facility gap between 
clusters of items. They also used the criteria of their 
own judgement of the existence of a fair degree of 
mathematical coherence to test items. Also the groups had 
to be reasonably scalable in that success at a higher level 
implied success at lower levels. Test items bearing none 
of these characteristics appear to have been dropped. For 
seven of the nine topic areas the items were grouped into 
four levels. Up to 20% of pupils at 15 failed to reach the 
lowest level. Two topics more conveniently coalesed into 
six and seven levels. There was no exact match between 
topic levels although unsurprisingly performance between 
tests was correlated. Inspection of the range of children 
performing at each level suggests enough usefulness of the 
concept to be a guide to the teacher as to when to leave 
off development of one topic area and move to the lower end 
of the same level in another topic. [3061 Hart suggests 
lit t1e to characterise stage one and two ("stage" and 
"level" are used indistinguishably) but stage three 
is 
characterised by, "the appearance of the first level of 
abstraction" [3071, movement away from concrete referents 
and the emergence of strategy. Stage four, 
"involves 
abstraction as well as the application of a 
fund of 
knowledge" [3081. The percentage of 15 year olds clearly 
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attaining stages one to four was respectively, 22%, 28%, 
22% and 8%; although Hart indicates that most stage three 
fifteen year olds can begin some stage four problems. 
Hacker 3 09 studied- behaviour in 864 science 
lessons covering the twelve years of compulsory Australian 
education. He used 3751 pupils and 144 teachers in 
unstreamed or occasionally middle range classes. His 
system of analysis delineated twelve levels of intellectual 
ability practised (from "acquiring, recalling or confirming 
facts" to "inferring from observed or recorded data") and 
combined it with iline modes of learning (eg. teacher 
questions, pupil interacting with science resource 
materials) out of which a hierarchy of six levels of 
intellectual development in science was produced. These 
were related to the observers' post lesson written summary 
of content. Hacker argued that classroom behaviour gave a 
better view of the inevitable interaction between pupil and 
subject material rather than either abstract subject 
analysis or theoretically preconceived logical stages 
reified by experiment. 
His categories are unsurprising and each loosely 
characterise an age range in Australian education 
from 
lower primary to upper secondary. Group five (lower/upper 
secondafy) embodies, "Development of progressively more 
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abstract theoretical constructs. Emphasis on the data 
summarising characteristics of these constructs and their 
application. " Group six (upper secondary) begins with, 
"Emphasis on the hypothesis-generating characteristics of 
theoretical constructs. Formulating hypotheses about 
significant scientific problems and designing controlled, 
multivariate, empirical tests. " 
The groups were obtained by cluster analysis which 
is a controversial statistical technique. [3101 [3111 more 
significant perhaps is Hacker's conclusion that, "For the 
abilities studied, the results are generally consonant with 
the notion of gradual, quantitative changes in pupil 
thinking, rather than with the notion of discrete, 
qualitative stages with emergent intellectual functions. " 
He notes that almost all of the twelve intellectual 
abilities practised occurred in classrooms at all levels. 
If anything there appears to be an early and late emphasis 
on science process skills with a middle years emphasis on 
acquiring facts although there is a greater use of the 
higher intellectual abilities in the upper age groups. 
Kuhn,, Amsel and O'Loughlin [3121 might fall at what 
Hacker would regard as the learner polarisation of the 
division of theories between learner evolution and logical 
acquisition of the prescribed material. However Kuhn 
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et. als. ' conclusions from small sample experiments with 
pupils and adults also play down the existence of global 
intellectual stages but do show that levels of logical 
sophistication are initially tied to particular subject 
areas experienced and then may generalise to related areas 
while being absent in others for most adults. 
They formulate three key abilities for scientific 
thinking; "the ability to think about a theory rather than 
with it, the ability to represent information to be 
evaluated apart from the representation of the theory and 
the ability to ignore personal views and assess evidence 
objectively in terms of what it means for the theory. "[3131 
Individuals show a gradual increase in the degree of these 
abilities from third to ninth grade but non college adults 
perform about the level of sixth graders and worse than the 
average ninth grader. [3141 They conclude, "Late 
elementary and early high school are probably the most 
critical in terms of science education and development of 
scientific thinking skills. There may be a potential 
during this age range for facilitating development of ways 
of thinking about evidence and theories that is absent 
before this time and diminished afterwards, " since limited 
strategies once formed are hard to break down. [3151 
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Chapter 6 
Investigations into the acquisition of cybernetic concepts 
The previous chapter explored ways of approaching 
the cognition of cybernetic concepts. Clearly we can not 
advance in all directions at once. The first steps need to 
avoid too many presuppositions and be feasible while 
throwing as much light as practicable on some significant 
set of the possibilities raised. The main investigation 
involved an examination of various groups' understanding of 
and facility with the concept of feedback, utilising 
methods of introducing the concept which experience and 
theory had suggested wculd be most effective. As well as 
its intrinsic cognitive interest the investigation was 
chosen to highlight the balance in the cybernetic 
problematic between conceptual and cognitive problems. 
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6.1 Investigational rationale 
It has been argued by a number of writers [3161 
[3171 LF3181 [3191 [3201 [3211 that the scientific study of 
situations involving human consciousness poses special 
problems. Brief'Ly the traditional experimental requirement 
of "ceteris paribus" is difficult to impose since a mind 
will place its own construction on the stimuli or 
environment in an experimental situation which may be 
different from that of the investigator. However a move 
towards the more ethnographic or conversational end of 
social science data collection is open to the danger of 
subjective contamination by the observer/experimenter not 
to mention the problem of demonstrating that such dangers 
were minimised. 
Frequently moreover there is a tension between the 
reliability of results obtained and their broad 
significance or generalisability. This is particularly 
likely to be so in the early stages of conceptual 
development of an area where there is no widely accepted 
paradigm (in TS Kuhn's sense [3221) so that a tight mesh 
of theory could give limited empirical findings a much 
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wider range of significance. Clearly then the development 
of an area requires a trawl for possible hypctheses and 
connections in the hope that a tighter structure will 
emerge capable of more refined testing. It is worth noting 
that mainstream practice in experimental psychology still 
falls short of what statisticians generally regard as 
desirable. [3231 
Thus initial data collection attempted to follow 
the format of the open ended interview, i. e apart from the 
initial question the interviewer proceeds by seeking as 
much elaboration as possible of the interviewee's responses 
and avoids cueing for any of his or her own hypotheses. 
Three former Brunel cybernetics MSc. students, and one 
doctoral student,, were asked,, "What problems did you find 
that you had with cybernetics concepts? " Seven lecturers 
or past lecturers in cybernetics, from four universities, 
were asked, "What problems did/do you find students 
had/have in learning about cybernetics? " With the 
ex-students it was possible to maintain the open-ended 
format throughout. With a minority of the lecturers it 
seemed probable that they would "run dry" after a few 
led by more minutes so responses were elicit leading 
questions. A number of interviewees produced their most 
interesting comments after the formal interview was over 
in 
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a conversation involving a mutual exchange of ideas. 
It would not be worth doing significance statistics 
on the contents of these interviews. However issues 
emerged or were confirmed which probably pruned the number 
of hypotheses seriously entertained by the interviewer. A 
wide variety of points were raised but the main ones have 
emerged already. Only one of the ex-students seriously 
considered that problems might exist with themselves; one 
saw considerable problems in the cohesion of the subject 
matter and the variety of approaches, one said there were 
no problems and the third felt that any problems were 
minor. The doctoral student would have liked a mcre 
structured introduction to cybernetic concepts and felt 
that at best the link between certain areas was left too 
implicit. The majority of lecturers felt that there could 
be problems for students in the degree of abstraction and 
generalisation required. Two felt that there might be 
problems inherent in the cybernetics "program" which would 
then present as problems for students. on differing 
criteria the background of students was proposed as 
significant for success; the proposed criteria were 
possibly linked to the type of course taught. Fellgett's 
comments about the poor grasp of fundamentals in maths and 
physics among A-level applicants for cybernetics supports 
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this theme. [3241 
A second preliminary investigation took the form of 
a series of written questions capable of systems oriented 
answers which were given to three groups of about twenty 
for a written reply. No suggestion of the type of answer 
required was given although when asked, the specified 
length of each answer was given as, "A few lines. " The 
first was a class of 11 to 12 year olds who had been 
exposed to a term's teaching using the work cards 
illustrated in my M. Sc. dissertation. The second group 
were from the same year without any formal cybernetics 
teaching although they had been exposed to computer 
programing and had seen elementary robctics work. Both 
groups wrote out their answers without consultation during 
lesson time. The third group were teachers in the same 
school who were asked to return their answers in their own 
time. Four did so. The highest proportion of systems 
oriented explanations came from the class which had been 
taught systems and cybernetics concepts, considerably less 
from the control class and least from the adults. Some of 
the non-respondents said that they fc-und the questions too 
difficult to give time to. All this investigation shows is 
that children can be taught a way of looking at things 
which is not characteristic of some (most? ) educated 
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adults. Incidently the writer also tried teaching 
cybernetic concepts to children without the practical 
exercises and discussion indicated in his M. Sc. 
dissertation and found the results embarrassing in terms of 
the distorted concepts formed and accordingly stopped 
wasting their time and perhaps putting them under 
illegitimate intellectual pressure. Thus a number of 
propositions have so far coalesced for consideration. 
i/ The universe may simply not be constructed so 
that seeking similarities between complex entities can be 
very fruitful. 
ii/ All or most human beings may be so constructed 
that they are poor at identifying what systems similarities 
exist. (Both i/ and ii/ would have implications for a/ the 
current development of the subject and b/ people's ability 
to understand it. ) 
iii/ most current educational and social 
environments inhibit or fail to facilitate the grasp of 
systems and cybernetics concepts. 
iv/ There may be a split for many individuals 
between their implicit and their explicit understanding of 
cybernetic concepts and/or processes. 
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V/ There is a critical stage after which it is far 
harder for individuals to develop systems and cybernetic 
concepts. 
vi/ Cybernetics is par excellence an 
interdisciplinary subject. However there are strong 
sociological forces operating to maintain existing subject 
demarcations (autopoesis? ). Hence cybernetics has failed to 
achieve the "critical mass" to acquire the resources to 
develop a sufficiently impressive body of work to justify 
the cognitive demands for many people. 
vii/ Any combination of any degree of the above 
factors could lead to certain cybernetics concepts having 
been poorly formulated. 
viii/ Hence many cybernetics concepts are 
superficially easy but fundamentally problematic. 
ix/ The existing lack of focus enables individuals 
to project peripheral concerns into the fora of cybernetic 
discussion thus compounding the confusion. 
X/ Detailed investigation is crucial to scientific 
development. Inevitably that detail must be applied in a 
specific more concrete subject area. Hence 
developments 
triggered by a cybernetic orientation will tend to be 
- 128 - 
ýp 
regarded as an attribute of that speciality rather than of 
cybernetics and as a corollary linked to ii/, iii/ and iv/ 
the greatest payoffs for cybernetics will come from 
expertise in at least two specialities apart from 
cybernetics (although this limitation is reduced by 
interdisciplinary team membership). 
xi/ Student's comfort with cybernetics courses is a 
function of the match between their academic background and 
the emphasis of the course eg. physical science based/ 
non-physical science based. 
xii/ Current teaching falsely assumes access to a 
large data base of exemplars of the abstractions taught. 
Therefore more examples need to be given along with 
techniques for generating such exemplars. 
Some of these propositions are clearly difficult to 
test although arguments have been marshalled. It was 
decided that the most accessible initial approach was to 
examine a range of individuals' facility in handling a 
particular cybernetic concept, namely feedback. 
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6.2 Outline of Procedure 
The investigation was designed so as not to unduly restrain 
subjects range of response and prevent the emergence of new 
insights, while rendering some aspects of the results 
amenable to statistical analysis. The procedure is 
influenced by Vygotsky's notion of the "zone of proximal 
develc. pment" [325] and Pask's "steady state or null point 
technique" creating a particular "operating region" [ 32 61 
(so that task demands were modulated so as to maintain 
genuine coupling to the task and not underload cr overload 
an individual's operating capacity). 
Individuals were tested for their ability to 
understand three concrete situations involving feedback, 
their tendency to abstract the characteristic of feedback 
in those situations, their claims to understand the concept 
once it was offered and their ability to generate further 
examples of feedback given cueing with three further less 
concrete exemplars of feedback. A standard creativity test 
(uses for a brick) was also given for comparison. 
The subjects were five groups of eight, each half 
male arid half female. The three groups of children were 
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aged 10,12 and 14-16 respectively. The two groups of 
adults were non-graduates and graduates. Apart from 
graduates the subjects were recruited over a range of 
social classes and to avoid the predominance of any 
particular level of academic success. Children were 
recruited from two middle schools and one secondary school 
and (due to time pressures during term) by extended 
informal chains of acquaintance. The latter method was 
used to recruit adults. All subjects were asked if they 
would like to take part in an experiment. One fourteen 
year old was reluctant and was not pressed. All subjects 
were unpaid. 
Subjects were told, "I am trying to find out how 
different people think about or look at different things. " 
When asked for more information the answer given was, "I 
don't want to tell you any more before the experiment in 
case I influence you to give me my ideas instead of 
yours. " 
- exemplar of a form of feedback involved a The first 
partial replication of the previously cited investigation 
of Joan Bliss in which a marble ran down a series of slopes 
triggering a pivcted bar at the bottom in such a way that 
the next marble was released frcm the top and so on. A 
photograph of the apparatus constructed is on page 
134. 
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After the demonstration the subjects were asked to explain 
how it worked. The criterion of understanding was that 
subjects stated that the marble hitting the bottom of the 
bar released the next marble and so on. 
The second exemplar was a small tank (photograph 
page 135) with a ball cock mechanism and at the base a 
tap. The ball cock mechanism was connected to an open tap 
so that subjects first encountered the tank with the water 
level static, the intake being choked off by the ball cock 
lever. They were asked to examine the syster. to explain 
what was going on. It was pointed out to them that they 
could turn on or off the tap at the bottom and gently try 
and move any other part of the system. If subjects came 
out with a factually inaccurate statement about what 
happened they were asked to test it. Where subjects were 
still failing to arrive at an accurate explanation whether 
they had made any factually inaccurate statements or not 
they were asked, "If the water level was down to here (a 
point below the resting level was indicated) and the tap 
(indicating the tap of the tank) turned off what would 
happen to the water level? " If they simply indicated that 
it would go up they were asked, "Where to? 11 and then if 
reasons had not been volunteered, "Why? " subjects had to 
indicate awareness that the water wculd always return to 
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the same level and that this involved the level of the ball 
controlling the inflow of water. The three individuals who 
did not achieve an explanation were then given one. 
The third exemplar involved a small Lego buggy 
(photograph page 136) which subjects were asked to guide 
along a straight line for between one and two metres and 
then explain how they did it. They were restricted to 
holding the pull cord about ten centimetres from its 
connection with the steering wheel. Where an explanation 
was incomplete they were prompted with the question, "If 
the buggy goes off course to the right of the line what do 
you do to get it back on course? " and then, "If the buggy 
goes off to the left what do you do? " Where the words 
"left" and "right" were confusing "towards you" or "away 
from you" were substituted. 
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The criterion of understanding was that subjects 
volunteered that the Luggy had to be pulled in the opposite 
direction to the one in which it was going off course. 
The next step was to ask subjects if they cculd 
think of any way in which all three situations were 
similar. This question was repeated until they ran out of 
suggestions. Then they were asked if there was any way in 
which just two of the situations were similar. This 
question was repeated for any pair the subject offered 
until they ran out of suggestions. With two subjects, a 
graduate engineer and an economist, the classification that 
they all involved feedback was rr.. ade and the next step was 
omitted. 
Clearly only the second and third exemplars 
involved negative feedback and this was the concept of 
feedback which was presented to the subjects. Subjects 
were given the following description cr a close 
paraphrase. "What I am most interested in is how with the 
tank and the buggy you've gc. t something controlled so that 
it comes back tc where you want it, or some particular 
situation. The water comes back to the same level; your 
brain and arms with the buggy bring it back on to the 
line. Now people call this feedback. (With adults and 
14-16s "This is the idea of feedback. ") It means that 
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whatever the system does to go off course you get the right 
adjustments to bring it back to where it should be, some 
kind of fairly stable situation. " Subjects were allowed to 
ask any further questions until they felt they had got the 
idea (but nc further examples were given at this stage). 
one subject, aged 10, did not feel he understood at this 
stage but the procedure was continued with, at the end of 
which he gave a plausible example and declared that he 
understood. 
Tney were then asked to think up their own examples 
cf feedback but were told that they could ask fcr some more 
examples when they needed help with ideas. The first 
example involved playing a guessing game in which the 
subject had to find the number from 1 to 100 that the 
investigator was thinking of (viz. 35). At each guess 
subjects were told if they were too high, to low or 
correct. With each exam-ple given by the investigator the 
subject was asked tc explain how this involved feedback and 
if they had difficulties the experimenter gave the 
explanation. 
The second example was that of a central heating 
thermostat. If the mechanism by which it could operate was 
problematic for the subjects they were shown a simple 
device in which heating or cooling created a movement which 
- 138 - 
10 
could in princil3le turn a heater on or off. (A conical 
flask with a cork with a glass tube through it and a 
balloon on the end which inflated or deflated when hot or 
cold water was run over the flask. ) 
The final example involved a demonstration started 
by the invest iga-IC-or in which he closed one eye and raised 
his little finger held almost at arm's length and began to 
approach that little finger with the little finger tip of 
the other hand with the avowed air. of bringing it to touch 
the more distant little finger tip exactly. But before 
moving very far the investigator asked the subject to try 
it very carefully for themselves and notice what happened. 
occasionally subjects suggested the thermostat 
example tefore the investigator was due to give it. in 
this case the fact was mentioned and the next example 
given. 
When subjects' own examples were ambiguous or 
inccrrect they were first asked to explain how feedback was 
involved in that situation and if the rationale fell short 
of criteria this was pointed out and the criterion 
repeated. 
once subjects had produced all the examples they 
felt able to they were told that they had four minutes to 
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write down (or dictate if they wanted) all the possible 
uses they could think of for an cbject they would be told. 
Once that was clear they were told "a brick" and timing 
began. 
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6.4 Tables of Results 
6.4.1 Key 
The summaries of subject's performance are grouped by age 
and then adults arid graduates. The first column indicates 
a code for subjects' names; ir, or f denotes sex; with 14 to 
16 year olds age is given and with c1der people a rough 
indicator; adults' jobs are shown and graduates' degree 
subjects. 
The second, "Criterion" column indicates with a 
tick cr a cross whether the subjects were able to explain 
the slope and marble, the tank and the buggy to criterion. 
Underneath, the figure 3 comes before a summary of any 
factors which subjects felt all three situations had in 
common and the figure 2 precedes a summary of what they 
felt any two had in common. Where the category does not 
make it otvious which two situations were referred tc the 
letters; sFt, or b are used tc indicate the slope and 
marble, tank and buggy respectively. 
The widest column gives as brief as possible a 
characterisation of each example of feedback the subject 
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produced. Mistaken examples are placed inside square 
brackets. Inside rounded brackets are marked the points 
when the additional examples were given; (G) for the 
riguessing" game (the figure in front shows the number of 
guesses to criterion), (T) for thermostat and (f) for the 
finger touching example. 
The next four columns indicate how many feedback 
examples were given at each of the four possible positions 
before, between or after the various cues, - prompt" 
means tefcre any prompts were given, + gues-s" ffeans after 
the guessing game but before the thermostat, if + therm" 
m-eans after the thermostat and before the finger and "+ 
finger" means items given after the finger example. 
The next column "Classes" indicates how many 
different classes of feedback examples were offered. The 
ten classes arrived at were; steering, human-machine, huiran 
goal seeking/purposes, human interaction, physiological, 
computer/robc-tic, electronic and/or mechanical, ecological, 
economic, and sociological/political. Clearly these are 
not exclusive classes from a logical hierarchical point of 
view, but they do reflect the way subjects appeared to make 
associations. Any given example is put iritc the most. 
specific class for which it qualifies even if logically 
it 
cculd belong to a wider category; for example no computer 
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examples would be counted in the electronic and/or 
mechanical category. 
The penultimate column "Feedback" gives the total 
number of feedback examples and the final column "Brick" 
the total number of uses of a brick generated. 
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6.5. Statistical Summary 
FEEDBACK EXAMPLES 
subject los 12s 14-16s Adults Grads. 
groups 
means 1.125 7.5 7.625 6.625 18.5 
standard 0.78 6.67 7.46 2.64 7.58 
deviations 
CLASSES OF FEEDBACK 
means 0.875 2.75 3.75 3.125 5.5 
standard 0.78 1.78 3.07 1.05 1.87 
deviations 
BRICK EXAMPLES 
means 5 6.83 9.75 13.875 
standard 3.52 1.67 3.23 4.56 
deviations 
ERROR RATIOS 
(total examples of feedback offered : number of mistakes) 
0.4 0.077 0.047 0.172 0.045 
overall 0.086 
Feedback - significance of difference of means 
by randomisation test [3271 (1-tailed), 
adults and graduates: p=0.0079 
Feedback - significance of difference of means 
by randomisation test (1-tailed), 
12 years and 10 years: p=0.0154 
Feedback - significance of ratio of variances (F score) 
15s and adults F=2.238 -not significant at 0.05 level 
Grads. and adults F=7.857 -significant at . 01 level 
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Brick - significance of difference of means by 
randomisation test, (1-tailed), 
14-16s vs. 10s and 12s: p=0.0909 
Brick - significance of difference of means by 
randomisation test (1-tailed), 
14-16s vs. adults: p=0.3150 
joint probability continuously rising brick score, from 
multiplying previous two ps=0.0286 
Brick and Feedback correlation, Pearson product-moment 
coefficient 
10s & 12s 14-16s Adults Grads. All 
. 92 . 91 . 03 . 07 . 
65 
significnce >. 05 >. 01 -->. 01 
level [3281 
mean feedback score: girls 2.9 
boys 7.9 
t value for significance of difference of two means 1.38 
significance level 2 tailed test c. 0.2 
mean feedback score: women 13.25 
men 11.875 
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6.6 Discussion of Results 
Firstly the results indicate that given concrete exemplars 
of feedback most people can grasp the concept and from the 
age of about twelve generate a reasonable number of 
examples. The population as a whole can provide a 
considerable variety of responses. Giving people more 
examples helps the majority to generate more of their own. 
However there is no demonstrable improvement between 12 and 
adulthood (in contrast to performance on the brick test). 
This corroborates Kuhn, Amsel and O'Loughlins'[3291 
findings that for most people some scientific thinking 
skills either did not improve or actually declined from 
adolescence to adulthood. it is interesting that this 
pattern of ability occurs for productivity with a 
particular scientific concept (feedback) as well as with 
Kuhn et. als. ' tests in skills of using scientific concepts 
and methodology. 
There is then some evidence for the "critical 
stage" concept but hardly one specific to cybernetics as 
this particular investigation does not show cybernetic 
thinking to be significantly different in its maturation 
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from other components of scientific thinking at the 
conceptual level investigated. Presumably the apparent 
plateau or decline with most adults could be changed by 
more teaching of systems and cybernetic concepts along the 
lines previously demonstrated as well as by greater efforts 
in general science teaching to ensure that general 
abstractions can be related to a wide range of practical 
activities. 
The relative productivity of graduates does not of 
course prove that there is no conceptual difficulty for 
them with cybernetic concepts; maybe their success is due 
to their "shaping" with this particular investigational 
method with this particular concept. However the 
conceptual difficulty thesis remains experimentally 
unproven. 
The lack of correlation between brick scores and 
feedback scores for adults indicates that for them the task 
was not simply one of "divergent thinking"[330] although it 
is worth considering how far a component of creativity may 
simply be the capacity to abstract and then search a data 
base for exemplars of that abstraction. The correlation 
with children may indicate a common mechanism or 
it may be 
that the two abilities are linked to a common individual 
maturational factor. For the fourteen to sixteen year olds 
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the fact that the brick test was always easier accounts for 
some of the correlation. Inspection of individual scores 
indicates that performance on one would be a poor predictor 
of the other; in other words the effect size is low. 
Finally, despite appearances there is no proof of a 
sex bias in the children's feedback scores. Arguably 
either the technological emphasis with the examples or the 
sex of the investigator might have created an asymmetry. 
Thus it is worth bearing in mind the possibility of a type 
II error. 
6.6.1 Discussion of Verbal Responses 
The brief summaries of each example of feedback 
offered may sometimes seem inappropriately characterised as 
right or wrong. In ambiguous situations the subject's 
explanation of the existence of feedback determined if it 
was categorised as an error. occasionally the individual 
appeared to have the germs of a good idea but lacked the 
skills to justify it. This may be related to Broadbent and 
Berry's "implicit" understanding. 
The errors in exemplifying feedback highlight some 
of the problems with the concept discussed in section 
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4: 3: 3. The "wheel with weight" error referred to the boy's 
observation of a free bicycle wheel coming to rest with the 
valve lowest. Similarly the "blood pressure gauge" example 
referred to the way in which the mercury bounced around on 
its way to a stable resting point. Both are analogous to 
categorising the pendulum as feedback which was mentioned 
in the, "Fuzzy concepts of Feedback, " section. A related 
dilemma to gravity driven stability was raised by the 
General Engineering graduate who initially categorised all 
three introductory situations as exemplifying feedback but 
later changed his mind about the marble run on the grounds 
that it was simply delayed falling under gravity. other 
examples of feedback being identified with any stabilising 
situation were the, "fixed bias compensator, " the 
"expansion rollers at bridge end, " and the "photochromic 
lens. " 
A common misconception with twelve year olds when 
the concept of feedback is introduced without any concrete 
situation to manipulate is that feedback refers to any 
serial process. This was exemplified by the, "screwing 
tops on toothpaste in a factory,. " example and that of the 
washing machine. (obviously a washing machine may be 
viewed not as a series of operations but as incorporating 
feedback with temperature and water level controls, but 
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this was not the case in the example cited. ) 
Another class of error seems to be to identify 
feedback with something that gives imperatives, a buoy, 
traffic lightsf an alarm clock, without being able to say 
how output affects input in some kind of control 
situation. 
Perhaps surprisingly there is only one obvious 
error due to feedback being identified with any circular 
process, in the example of recycling newspaper. 
The largest remaining category of error lies in 
superficial analogies from identified feedback situations; 
the ten year old who justified, "opening books, " as 
feedback because there was a straight line where the pages 
joined and there had been straight movement in the first 
three situations, or the trainee plasterer who said he 
suggested air lines to a fishtank because of the movement 
through a pipe in the ball cock set up. However the 
possibility referred to initially remains, that some 
examples are arrived at unconsciously for better reasons 
than are used to justify them. The ten year old may have 
had intimations about searching backwards and forwards for 
a page number; the trainee plasterer may have been working 
on the analogy of controling the use of an essential fluid, 
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which would cover his previous example. However it would 
be asking too much of an initial study of conceptualisation 
of a cybernetic concept to demonstrate a model of partial 
access to unconscious processing. 
The similarities suggested between the first three 
situations demonstrated show a widespread capacity to 
identify common elements although some were superficial 
eg. all items contained something round. The 
automatic/non-automatic distinction is widespread but about 
thirtY per cent also came up with some generalisation which 
could be at least nascently related to feedback; guidance, 
triggering, remote effects, continuous process, reaction, 
compensation, circuit like, moving to a predetermined 
norm. 
It is noteworthy that capacity to formulate a high 
level abstraction does not necessarily imply ability to 
propose a large number of examples of that abstraction. 
Three of the graduates volunteered that they knew there 
must be many more examples but it was hard to provide 
them. No subjects had immediate access to all ten of the 
classes of feedback situations in which subjects' responses 
fell. The highest scorer taught microelectronic design and 
contrasted the emphasis of her education as a scientist 
with that as a designer with its concern to identify 
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options. As suggested before, the move from the concrete 
to the abstract is highly valued by the educational system 
but the skill of applying abstractions in concrete 
situations is generally less emphasised. Thus it may be 
possible for discourse to take place in a "high level 
language" without any notion of reality checking at the 
level of implementation. Presumably a language level can 
be regarded as autopoetic, and there is a warning here for 
many fields of study. 
The examples given by subjects show some obvious 
influences from their jobs or degree subjects but there is 
little evidence of their using a single style or strategy 
to generate examples. Some of the youngest children were 
only able to give examples of steering and other subjects 
at times produced chains of close analogies, although it is 
worth considering that what may be a close analogy for one 
person may be a considerable intellectual leap for 
another. The broader strategy of searching within larger 
classes is generally apparent. As with the bricks task, at 
times subjects gazed around the room or oriented to distant 
noises in an apparent search for examples. What other 
mechanisms of internal search were going on was simply not 
apparent but it is plausible that the variety of 
individual 
experience that people draw upon is going to reduce 
the 
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payoff for attempts to characterise them as a particular 




7.1 An Evolving Perspective of Cybernetics 
The results of the previous section indicate that 
while there are some problems in the actual cognition of 
cybernetic concepts they can be reduced by directed 
attention to the cybernetic features of a variety of 
hardware artefacts and that giving more examples increases 
most individual's ability to apply cybernetic concepts. 
However the ability of most people to engage with 
the task of understanding a key cybenetic concept strongly 
suggests that the problems voiced in chapter one can not 
simply be attributed to human intellectual weakness and to 
that degree some misgivings about the subject per se are 
strengthened. The earlier part of this thesis demonstrated 
that while an identifiable cluster of ideas composing 
cybernetics exists it is a somewhat ragged one with 
elements of its history suggesting missed opportunities and 
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sloppiness. 
With regard to the five areas of controversy 
addressed, the machine model of human beings and the 
mechanistic accounts of purposiveness were judged as 
research orientations worthy of pursuit, while the concepts 
of feedback and information theory, beyond a limited range, 
contained ambiguities for users and within themselves which 
needed clear articulation. The concept of requisite 
variety, at least outside a narrow range was judged to be 
misleading. 
The examination of avenues towards the cognition of 
cybernetic concepts has shown an area wide open to 
investigation through a variety of models. The specific 
investigations undertaken in the previous section show the 
area's tractability at even a fairly low level and confirm 
the evidence in the related literature of the fruitfulness 
of basic experience with concrete examplars, provided 
attention is actually drawn to the abstractions concerned. 
Adults' ability to handle cybernetics concepts, like the 
concepts of scientific procedure themselves, would almost 
certainly be better with better earlier training. 
That there do exist common systems phenomena in a 
variety of areas was affirmed by the lists of exemplars 
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given in Chapter 4, Section 2. However their very ubiquity 
in the toolkit of most scientists calls into question the 
need for a separate subject. This is reinforced by the 
tendency of general concepts to emerge from empirical 
investigations rather than vice versa. Whether more useful 
generally applicable concepts about the organisation of 
complexity will emerge (as did catastrophe and chaos 
theory) is an empirical question. As they have in the past 
we can not demonstrate that it is unreasonable to look. 
Whether such concepts will emerge from a self conscious 
search within the field of cybernetics at a high level of 
generalisation is another empirical question. It is worth 
noting that the lower level and more concrete the research 
the more easily guaranteed and apparent is the payoff. 
However while we may be sceptical about the productivity of 
cybernetics at a high level of generality, whatever its 
convenience as a toolkit or classification scheme, the 
example of Boolean algebra and symbolic logic, which 
appeared initially useless but made computers possible, 
suggest that we can not dismiss the possibility of fruitful 
returns from such a strategy. Possibly a greater 
determination within cybernetics for rigorous self 
criticism will make that development more likely. 
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